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This thesis examined the political history of Black Nationalism in America in 
order to determine those internal organizational factors that have prevented Black 
Nationalists, specifically of the Black Power Era (1 966-1 975), from achieving self- 
determination, with the highest expression being the founding of an independent Black 
nation-state. 
The study was based on the premise that the goal of Black Nationalism was the 
founding of a Black nation-state for African-Americans. A historical comparative 
analysis was used to determine what internal factors prevented Black Nationalists from 
successfully founding a Black nation-state. 
The researcher found several internal factors that interfered with the founding of a 
Black nation-state. Factors which contributed to the unsuccessful movement were the 
immaturity of Black Nationalist leadership, the abandonment of political programs, shifts 
1 
in program strategies, and the antagonism and neglect of the Black Church as an ally in 
the movement. The conclusion drawn from the findings suggest that there are other 
internal factors which need further exploration. 
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Definition of Terms 
Black Nationalism- an ideology that promotes black autonomy and control of black 
institutions that ultirnztely seeks the establishment of an mdependen: 
black nation-state w ~ t h  defkite geogrnphic boundaries. 
African-.American- people of A h c m  descent who are legal citizens of the Cnlted States 
of America. 
Black Power Era- period ~n history fixor?: i965 15175 
Biack Liberation the rzmoval of ail ibrrns o f ~ p p t  essioxi that prevent Africarl- 
hrericaris f ion~ rr,aximl~nng their potential as individuals ard as a 
nation. 
Plebiscite- , a hl-rrited Natims supev;iscd ~~clte icl determine the national wi!l and 
destiny of a people wllo are identifiable as a separate and 6jsii1~c: 
ethic,  cultural, and national ~y-our) 
a70INTELPRO- Counter Intelligence Sgr::irrlz;xi, -. a Federal Bmeau of hvastigal~sn 
(FR3) p~oggla~  that largeled black nationalists and radical growp1s t~ 
destroy theix potential threat ~tto the status-quo of A ~ ~ e ~ i c r n  society, 
Black Belt Region- a tenitory in the southern United States consisting ofcauultjes that 
begin in Sonth C~ssrolji~a anti continue through Louislma that. have 
historically majority black populations. 
Black Powzr- a term used during the 1'460's md 1970's to designate the, inlention 
of African-hren cans to c~ntrol  $very aspect of their communities. 
Black Church- the dominant reiigious ~nstitution in the black community !bat 
promotes the teachings of Cb~istianity 
hnter-Communalism- the interdependence of communities to meet their needs that 
negates the existence of political-geographic boundaries. 
Self-Determination- the ability of a people to determine their own mationa! destiq 
by contxolllng the institutions, politics, culture, educafiiprr, econsrzlics, 
territory, and military defense of themselves as a nation 
BPE Black Power Era 
CRM Civil Rights Mrsvement 
SNCC Student Nan-vioient Ccardirating Committee 
iGFP- I-ownacs < '0rs11Q; Fr eer?om Party 
BPP I3ial.k Piiaiher Par s)i f i ~  Self-E1efi;rse 
PGWR '' ' F"rovisiond Govenmient- Regd,lic of New Africa 
RNA Republic a? New A rrica 
BLA Slack i,liberation Amiy 
NQI Nati:m ~7f Islam 
MAST li,i~orish Anieric;~ Sc-;Ie~ice Y errrple 
UNIA "ifiive~sa? Ncgm lmp~ovcrnent- Association 
ACS ' .b,mericl;lll Co1npiizalio;l Scx:iel\; 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to establish the political history of black 
nationalism in America and then ultimately to determine those internal organizational 
factors that have prevented black nationalists, particularly of the Black Power Era (BPE), 
fiom achieving self-determination, the highest expression being an independent nation- 
state. Since the beginning of Afi-ican enslavement in what is now the United States of 
America, there has been an effort on the part of many African-Americans and their 
descendants to be a fiee and independent people, having their own land, culture, and 
government. Each successive generation has attempted to accomplish this goal through 
various actions, beliefs, and practices that have developed into what is commonly 
referred to as black nationalism. There have been several movements, organizations, and 
leaders who have advocated and worked toward the fulfillment of the goal of an 
independent black state, both in and outside of North America. All of their attempts have 
failed with the exception of Liberia. 
The founding of Liberia serves as the only successful attempt by Aficans, once 
enslaved in America, to establish an independent nation-state. Although Liberia negates 
the complete fklure of black nationalists tc found an independent nation-state, the 
founding of Liberia was not able to bring fkeedon. libe~at~on, and national sovereignty to 
the masses of African people who were erlslaved in the south and living as "quasi-free" 
blacks in the rlorthern afid southen1 IJnited States. ,As fidture expatriatian--"back tc 
Afr;,ca9'--- movcmellts came and weize. througho~i vaious h~storical epoclrs, black 
nationalists, particularly of the BPF, began to argue for their legitimzte right ttc! establish 
a nation for themselves in tbeir riio~i recent-histoic a2cesl~al hornel;zrd of the southern 
IJ'nikd States. 
cdamentally, black nati~xlaiism seeks to do thee  things 1 )  To con tinac ihe 
tradition of African i~dependence aid natj0~1100d that has existed for se-i erai tho~~sancl:, 
of years; 2) 7.0 correct tllc danmge that has Seen done to Afican-~hericans as a result of' 
enslavement, racism, discaimination, and ather forms of oppression that has occurred as a 
~-esult of Emu-Arr,eI-zcan rule. and 3) To provis!e thc opportunity f ~ i  Af'Tican-PLMencaas 
to reach their full potential and maintain their cultural integrity as a people. These three 
basic premises set the parameters for the work that black  nationalist^ have taker1 or1 as the 
reason for the need for an indeperldent-so~erei~ nation for black people. 
The jradi tion cf Africac i~~liependencc and nzhionhood has been well-docurnerlted 
by historians such as John Jackson, Jchn Hope Franklin, and Cheik Anta 13iop.' Tne 
ancient empires of Khamit, Ethiopia, Merce , and the Sudan date as far back as 10,000 
years or mor e.3 The West Ahcan crnpires of Ghana, Songhay, and Mali continued that 
tradition into the pre-enslavement period, along with smaller states such as Hausa, Biram, 
Gallo, Kano, and Ktitsena to name a few h e l l  into ths enslavement period, Afiican 
independence and :;tatehood coatinsell with khan, Ashanri, anid the Yo:xiba btTLt*es of  
Benin and ~ ~ o . % ~ l ' a n s  en laved 2nd brought to the Lnited States sought to corltinuc 
Belr traditian of independence arid na;ir)rhcc?d 5y esta1,lishing maroon con~!nuxi;Ties 
dr_irsng the enslavement perkd." Tlzese ccm~~nwaiiics s r ~ ~ e d  as a constarat reminder to the 
ecslaved that they had a right to f eeda~n m d  i~:?epe~ldence and were fully c;~yahlc of 
- suuvivirig, prosperhng, and goverling them.la::el~ce;.s. 
"tatement of the Prctblem 
Contemporary black natisnalisls argue llral the establishment of an ir~dependcrek 
black state is necessary in order I'or 14fi.ican-Americd't1s to overcome the damage aonc lo 
! 
t31e:n as a result of 400 plus yeas uf appressior~.7 The his-tory of African-Americans i s  
. 1 
one filled with their fight againsr e n s l a v a ~ i ~ t ~  racisni, ;ulif d.rsc.nmination. Rlack 
. B 1  I 
ilationalists of every era have sougllt to overcome each =sfthese by separating the~xselvcs 
fro= whites in order ti\ establish their nwn insritutisns and nation where they wouir; be 
free to govern themselves, practice their ass11 culture, and live by their own laws. 
Black nationailsts also believe t h i .  in oi der hr. black. people to realize tkJei: Iull 
potential and maintain their culturzl l~zteg~ty, they tlllrst be able to govern ihernselve:~ a5 
a i~ation.~ Many of the social ills affecting black people. such as black-on-black crime, 
incarceration, drug abuse and addict~on, disease and health problems, mis-educaxion, 
poverty, and immoral~ty are believed to be the result of a systematic attempt by whites to 
destroy black people and their communities. Contemporary black nationalists since the 
1960s argue that white American culture and spirituality are fundamentally opposed to 
an African world-view and by continuing to exist in American society, African values 
and mores are severely compromised and destroyed? 
In their attempt to maximize the full potential of black people, black nationalists 
during the Black Power Era (BPE) began to act on the principles of independence in a 
variety of ways that had been expressed by black nationalists of previous generations. 
Malcolm X, who served as a historical bridge between two generations of black 
nationalist development, was able to synthesize these principles and articulate them to 
African-Americans so profoundly that he became the ideological leader of black 
nationalists during the BPE." Malcolm X, as national spokesman for the Nation of Islam 
(NOI) and during his period of separation fiom the NOI, presented several ideas and 
programs that he believed were necessary for black people to end their oppression by 
whites and to move toward the founding of an independent black nation-state. He was a 
strong advocate of self-defense, which the Black Panther Party of Self-Defense (BPP) 
made its central focus." Malcolm called for the development of independent black 
political parties that would elect black officials to represent the interests of black people, 
which was instituted by the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
through the founding of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO).'~ He 
supported black economic development through the establishment of businesses and 
encouraged blacks to support those businesses through their patronage. The Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE) made this a central part of their program during the BPE.13 
Malcolm X ultimately believed that black people would have to have their own nation if 
they were ever to be hlly respected and if they were to reach their full potential as a 
people. The Provisional Government of the Republic of New Africa (PGRNA), founded 
in, 1968, sought to make that expression a reality through their plan to take over five 
southern states as the homeland of the black nation.14 Malcolm X also taught that black 
people had to connect themselves and their struggle for human rights and independence 
to the world-wide struggle that was taking place in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
Stokely Carmichael (Kwarne Ture) advanced this perspective with the organization of the 
All Af'rican People's Revolutionary Party and Pan-Africanism as the primary objective of 
this organization. l5 
The majority of black nationalists applied some aspect of Malcolm X's analysis in 
their attempt to move black people forward and closer to the ultimate realization of being 
an independent sovereign nation. In their failure to accomplish the goal of founding a 
nation, they obviously made mistakes. The interest of this document is to determine what 
some of those mistakes were and provide an analytical discussion concerning how those 
mistakes impacted the failure of black nationalists to found a state. So, put simply, the 
purpose of this research is to outline the history of black nationalism in an attempt to 
determine the internal factors that have prevented black nationalists, particularly of the 
Black Power Era (BPE), from becoming a self-determined people who established an 
independent nation-state for African-Americans. 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of this paper will be Afrocentricity. Kathleen Bethel 
states that ". . . the basic premise of Afrocentricity is to study and examine phenomena 
from the standpoint of Africans as subjects, not objects."16 In the text Afrocentricity by 
Molefi Asante, Afrocentricity is discussed as a collective expression of a worldview that 
is grounded in the historical experience of African people.17 It is a worldview that 
emanates from and is centered in an Afi-ican cultural ethos that is unique to African and 
African-American people. As a cultural ethos, Afrocentricity informs, guides decisions, 
determines behavior, establishes value, creates order, and allows African and African- 
American people to share a common reality based on a collective consciousness. 
Afrocentricity allows one to take into account the traditional cultural, moral, and 
aesthetic values of African and African-American people and interpret, analyze, and offer 
criticism based upon an African and African-American value system. In doing so, 
scholars are able to evaluate the history, literature, and circumstances of African and 
African-American people through a lens that takes stock of their particular values, 
aspirations, customs, and history that is uniquely their own. Using Afrocentricity as a 
conceptual framework allows scholars to study, analyze, and critique African and 
Afi-ican-American people with a greater sensitivity, clarity and accuracy. This provides 
for better research and analysis, creates a better understanding of African and African- 
American people, and insures that the best interests of African and African-American 
people are maintained. This has not always been the case with the study of African and 
African-American people, who have been traditionally objectified by European and white 
American scholars. The value of the Afrocentric conceptual framework is demonstrated 
clearly by Kobi Kambon. 
In his article, "The Africentric Paradigm and Ahcan American Psychological 
Liberation," Kambon advances the theory that there is a distinct African worldview that 
is i~ opposition and conflict with a European worldview. Kambon states that, "The basic 
assumption underlying the Afiican American wrrrtdview reflects the notion of humanity- 
natwe unity or oneness . the human-nature relationship is defined as an interdependent, 
inseparable who~e." '~ From tl.~is worldview is developed a value system that places an 
emphasis on ". . . inclusiveness, cooperatioc, and collective responsibility, cooperateness 
and interdependence, spiritualism, cornplimentarity, and understaflding." According to 
Karnbon, "The basic assumption underlying the European American worldview is a 
human-nature dichotomy, organized 13 a conflictnal-antagonistic relationship." From this 
worldview is developed a value system o~"contro1 over nature" or "humanity versus 
nature" with ". . . an emphasis on exclusion and dichotomy, competition and individual 
rights, separation and independence, and materialism and aggression or inter~ention."'~ 
Kambon, along with other noted schola~s uch as Marimba h i ,  Wade Nobles, 
Naim Akbar, Chiek Anta Diop, and Asa Hilliard have advanced the theory of an 
Africentric Psychology/Personality that is rooted in a worldview or cosmology that is 
opposed and significantly diminished by African subordination and oppression at the 
hands of Europeans. The history of African-Americans as a7 oppressed group within 
white American hegemony has meant that there has been a gross distortion of the African 
worldview and absorption of European-American values that are detrimental to 
the well-being and functioning of African-Americans. In essence, by having adopted and 
participated in practicing European values, African-Americans have worked to advance 
the European worldview to the detriment and continued exploitation of themselves. 
In applying the African worldview and value system to the political, social, 
economic, and cultural existence of African-,4rnericans, the ideology of black 
nationalism acts as a vehicle to advance an African worldview and value system as 
opposed to a European worldview and value system. Darren Davis and Ronald Brown in 
their article, "The Antipathy of Black Nationalism: Behavioral and Attitudinal 
Inlplications of an Afiican American Ideology," state that ". . . it is important to consider 
nationalism as a psychological disposition emphasizing a variety of strategies such as the 
need for self-determination, self-governrnerlt,, separatism (acquisition of land), pride, and 
social identity."20 The two authors state further "A structured belief in black nationalism 
supports the liberation from oppressive conditions, emphasis on black people acquiring 
greater control over their destinies and resources, and an emphasis on a distinct Black 
worldview, culture, and heritage."2' Black nationalism therefore serves as an ideology 
that unifies the African worldview and values and seeks to mobilize them into the 
practical applications of building institutions, combating oppression, controlling 
resources, instilling pride, self-determination, and establishing and defending a nation. 
Utilizing an Afrocentric conceptual framework to study black nationalism as an 
ideology enhances the ability of scholars to evaluate and provide critical analysis of the 
various movements, organizations, and leaders from a perspective that is consistent with 
the cultural ethos of African and African-American people For example, the evaluation 
and critique of the factors that have prevented the establishment 01 a black nation-state 
can be analyzed using the principles, premises, and values of an African world-view, that 
should undergird black nationalist ideology, programs, and activities. Questions of 
leadership, programs, and strategies can be addressed using Afrocentricity to indicate 
where inconsistencies and departures froni those values have occurred and been 
detrimental to the larger goal of independent statehood The framework will also make it 
possible to provide a standard to assess the progress that black natiocalists have made 
toward achieving an independent nation-state. This will also help in determining what 
areas have Seen problematic historically and in contemporary times. If, in fact, there is 
an African worldview and value system that is inherent and relevant to the survival and 
advancement of African-Americans, then the plans, strategies, tactics, and activities of 
black nationalists should be reflective of that worldview and value system. 
Methodology 
The method used in this paper is the Historical-Comparative analysis approach 
(H-C) as outlined by W. Lawrence Neuman in Social Research Methods. This approach 
allows the study to take into consideration the historical development of black 
nationalism as a phenomenon among African-Americans and the American social 
context in which it has developed. Neuman states that the H-C approach was developed 
out of a frustration that social science researchers had with the existing models that weIe 
too static and one-dimensional to address questions such as, "'What causes revolutionary 
politics? How does mass consciousness change? and what caused the failure of a mass 
poljtical movement in the United States, that advocated greater equality and 
democracy."22 
The H-C approach is also utilized because of the interpretive possibilities it lends. 
This is acconlplished through its focus on culture as it ". . . tries to see through the eyes of 
those being studied, reconstructs the lives of the people studied, and examines particular 
individuals or groups."23 This makes the H-C approach very useful in addressing the 
fundamental issue of this paper, which is to determine the internal factors that have 
prevented black nationalists from founding an independent black nation-state, by taking 
into account the historical, cultural, political, and economic dynamics prevalent during 
the Black Power Era. 
The H-C approach also employs content analysis that allows the researcher to 
examine symbolic patterns in written, audio, visual, and other communicative forms.24 
As a result, the researcher is able to recognize and apply meaning to recurring events, 
themes, and circumstances that have occurred in the history of the people being studied. 
Utilizing both primary and secondary sources related to the topic of black nationalism, 
the research will be able to outline those symbolic patterns that have shzped and molded 
the ideology and goals of black nationalism across generations and historical periods. 
Identifying the symbolic patterns found in the literature provides for a basis to offer 
criticism, analysis, and solutions that are supported by the content of black nationalist 
history, rhetoric, and ideology. 
In using the H-C approach, a more in-depth analysis can be made concerning the 
factors that have prevented black nationalists fi-om founding an independent black-state 
By taking into account the history, culture, and social context in which black nationalism 
developed in the United States, the research will be able to operate from a position of 
objectivity that utilizes the standards ofblack nationalist ideology, objectives, and 
programs to crjtique and analyze individual leaders, organizations, and mcvements. It is 
hoped that, as a result, black nationalists and those interested in studying it will be able to 
delineate the weaknesses and strengths of ceriain positions, decisions, and strategies in 
order to achieve the goal of an independent black-state. 
Chapter organization 
The study is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which 
gives a brief overview of the purpose of this document and provides a statement of the 
problem related to the subject of black nationalism and its role as a major ideological 
phenomenon among African-Americans. The second chapter is a literature review, 
discussing what other scholars and historians have contributed to the research on black 
nationalism, their analysis and critique of the subject matter, and a discussion of the 
issues regarding the limitations of the present information concerning black nationalism. 
The third chapter discusses the history and development of early black nationalism 
beginning with its genesis in Africa through tke founding of the Nation of Islam. The 
fourth chapter focuses on the impact of Malcolm X on the development of black 
nationalism during the early 1960s as well as provides insight into the larger black 
nationalist community of Harlem. The fifth chapter discusses the development of black 
nationalism during the Black Power Era. The sixth and final chapter provides a detailed 
discussion of the internal factors that have prevented black nationalists fiom establishing 
a black state. This chapter explores specific decisions made by leaders and organizations 
regarding strategy, ideological shifts, and the disposition of black nationalists toward the 
Black Church. 
Limitations of the Study 
One of the limitations of the study is its lack of firsthand accounts from 
individuals who were involved in the organizations discussed and/or involved in the 
black nationalist movement during the BPE. Time constraints limited the number of 
desired interviews. Due to the clandestine nature of many of the activities that took place 
during the BPE, particularly regarding the Black Panther Party, many of the individuals 
who could provide detailed information concerning these organizations are incarcerated 
or are simply unwilling to divulge information that could be used against themselves or 
their comrades. 
Another limitation of the study is its lack of depth into the contextual and 
circumstantial conditions that existed during each period of black nationalist 
development. As a single research document, this thesis is limited to identifying a 
specific area to be discussed which means that, not all areas related to the topic will be 
given adequate consideration, even though, it is recognized that there are many factors 
that have contributed to the development of black nztionalism and the internal factors that 
have prevented black nationalists from establishi~~g an independent nation-state 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on black nationalism began with the publication of David Walker's 
Appeal in 1829. Walker's treatise on the condition and plight of African-American 
people serves as a cornerstone in black nationalist literature. It was the first docunient 
that spoke of the oppressed condition of African-Africans and presented a nationalist 
perspective on how to overcome that oppression. Walker states, "Our sufferings will 
come to an end, in spite of all the Americans this side of eternity. Then we will want all 
the learning and talents among ourselves, and perhaps more, to govern ourselves."' The 
principles of fighting against oppression and self-government, expressed by Walker, are 
two central themes of black nationalism that have permeated each historical period. 
Another foundational document is Martin R. Delaney's text, The Condition, 
Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically 
Considered of 1852, in which he states that Africans in the United States are, in fact, a 
nation similar to the various stateless minorities in the nations of Europe, and suggests 
that Africans should seek a national territory.2 Both texts identify the issues faced by 
blacks in their respective periods.. They both give statements in support of the need for 
blacks to have a nation of their own and to govern themselves as necessary to end their 
exploitation and oppression by whites. 
Although black nationalism continued to grow and foster the development of 
several organizations and leaders championing the cause of black freedom and 
independence, it was not until E.U. Essien-Udom published Black Nationalist, A Search 
for Identity in America, in 1962, that the first text appeared which discusses black 
nationalism as a political and methodological ideology. Essien-Udom's text, however, is 
limited to an organizational study of the Nation of Islam (NOI), which was the leading 
black nationalist organization at the time. The text is very informative regarding the 
history of the NO1 and provides insight into the development of its particular brand of 
religious-cultural nationalism that has achieved longevity, among other things, where 
other nationalist organizations have fallen by the wayside. Essien-Udom writes from the 
premise that the major interest and benefit that blacks who joined the NO1 obtained was 
the ability to transform the identification of being "black" as negative into a positive 
identity. He states that, "The need for identity and the desire for self-improvement are 
the two principle motives which lead individuals to join and remain in the Nation of 
 slam".^ In this context, black nationalism is treated as a means to develop racial pride, 
self-help, and morality in blacks living in the lowly existence of the urban ghetto and its 
immoral character. 
The limitation of this text stems from its primary focus on one organization 
without any attempt to contextualize the broader black nationalist movement. Essien 
Udom does mention that Marcus Gamey and Noble Drew Ali were black nationalist 
predecessors to Elijah Muhammad, but does not elaborate on how the two men 
influenced the development of the NOI. As the first secondary source 
on the topic of black nationalism, the book's shortcomings are also a result of the lack of 
scholarship available at the time. 
Two years later, the interest spawned in the media concerning the "black 
muslims" of the NOI, allowed Alex Haley to publish, The Autobiography of Malcolm X 
More than any other life story, the life and times of Malcolm X, inspired a massive 
expansion in the interest of black nationalism, particularly among the youth. For those 
who were either too young or unable to witness Malcolm X's analysis of the African- 
American condition, Haley captured it in his autobiography. Throughout the text, Haley 
interwove Malcolm X's critique and analysis of black life under white oppression. In the 
autobiography, Haley was able to interpret the facts of history into a message that became 
the gospel of black nationalism. Many African-Americans who read the book have 
claimed that it changed their lives forever. Its literary contribution to black nationalism 
was its ability to present a profound black nationalist perspective in a way that the masses 
of Afiican-Americans could digest. 
In 1966, Imari Obadele published War in America-The Malcolm X Doctrine. It is 
more a lengthy pamphlet than a complete text. However, it is foundational to black 
nationalist literature. Obadele wrote the document as an organizational guide with a brief 
segment on black history followed by an outline for the establishment of an 
independent black nation in the southern United States. Its contribution to the literature 
on black nationalism is that it is one of the first documents to connect the revolutionary 
efforts of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vessey, and Nat Turner to black nationalist history. 
Prior to Obadele's work, slave insurrections and their leaders were not considered part of 
the ideological or historical development of black nationalism. This was important 
because it provided a broader foundation for the development of black nationalism that 
included the military efforts of blacks in the antebellum south to free themselves as a 
primary step in the process of founding a nation-state. 
Obadele's work also serves as a beginning point for the development of critical 
analysis in the study of black nationalism. Obadele was, himself, involved in developing 
a nationalist movement and program; therefore, he wrote in a more persuasive style, 
which provided an analysis of how African-Americans could achieve national 
sovereignty. The intent of Obadele to implement a program to carry out the founding of 
an independent nation-state caused him to write with a different purpose than other 
scholars on the subject of black nationalism. His critique and analysis stemmed from a 
desire to make the founding of an independent nation-state a practical reality. 
The first text to deal with black nationalism comprehensively was The 
Rediscovery of Black Nationalism by Theodore Draper, published in 1 969. Draper 
presents a discussion on black nationalism based upon its resurgence as a major political 
ideology during the 1960s. He provides some historical background for the early 
classical and modem periods, tracing the development of W.E.B. Dubois into a Pan- 
Africanist and the issue of skin complexion as it related to Marcus Garvey's nationalist 
ideas. He also traces the development of the connection between land and self- 
determination. 
Draper had previously written about the Communist Party's view concerning the 
right of self-determination for African-Americans in the Black Belt (i.e., southern region 
of the U.S. with majority black populations) which moved him to conduct a larger study 
on black nationalism. In a chapter titled, "The Land Question", Draper presents an 
overview of the issues surrounding black nationalists' quest for land. His discussion 
begins with the early efforts of Paul Cuffe and other emigrationists to establish a land 
base in Afi-ica and continues through to the identification of black inner-city ghettoes and 
Black Belt regions of the south as colonies by Black Power advocates, such as Stokely 
Carmichael, Arniri Baraka, and Huey Newton. He points out the various viewpoints of 
black nationalist organizations and offers some criticism, but does so from an informative 
perspective rather than an analytical one. For example, he discusses the transition of the 
Black Panther Party from a revolutionary nationalist organization to a revolutionary 
socialist organization, emphasizing the BPP's affiliation with white radical socialist 
groups. Draper, however, fails to elaborate on the significance of the transition or the 
impact of the affiliation with white radicals on black nationalism or the BPP's success 
and/or failure. 
In 1970, John Bracey, August Meier, and Elliot Rudwick published a collection of 
primary documents Black Nationalism in America. It was the second text to assume 
black nationalism as a comprehensive subject. In the preface, Bracey states that, "This is 
the first collection of documents devoted exclusively to black nationalism, and the 
introduction is one of the few essays that attempt to lay out a pattern for black 
nationalism over the sweep of American hi~tory."~ 
The third text to further the serious study of black nationalism was The 
Beginnings of Black Nationalism by Victor Ullman. First published in 197 1, Ullman 
presents historical documentation of the developmerlt of black nationalism beginning 
with the emigration projects of Paul Cuffe and continuing through the work of Marcus 
Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). The book outlines 
key developments, such as the emigration movement and the founding of Liberia, the 
Black Convention Movement of the 1840s and the exploratory projects they 
commissioned, and the resurgence of the emigration movement after Reconstruction. 
The text is the first of its kind to organize the literature of the antebellum and post- 
antebellum periods into an outline of the formative genesis of black nationalism in the 
United States. Although it introduces the reader to the legacy of black nationalist 
thinking and activity, it limits itself to a historical overview. 
A criticism of Ullman's text is that he does not include a discussion of the three 
major slave insurrections and their leaders. Instead, he limits his discussion to the 
activities and programs of northern free blacks. In doing so, he omits a critical piece 
necessary to understand black nationalism's ideological appeal and longevity. As a 
result, the text does not represent the full dimension of black nationalism that included 
armed struggle against European enslavement of African-Americans. 
Sterling Stuckey added to the literature on black nationalism, in 1972, with the 
publication of The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism. Stuckley identifies six 
historical figures who contribute to the early writings on the subject of black nationalism 
(i.e., Robert Alexander Young, David Walker, Augustine, Sidney, Henry Highland 
Garnet, and Martin Delaney). The text publishes writings from all six men and discusses 
them in relation to the historical context of African-Americans during the antebellum 
period. Although the writings of these men indicate that they held a great concern for the 
oppressed condition of African-Americans, only David Walker and Martin R. Delaney's 
work expresses the desire for black autonomy. Stuckley identifies the concern these men 
had for racial pride, moral character, self-determination through industry, and the support 
for rebellion among enslaved Africans as the qualification for being the patriarchs of the 
ideological origins of black nationalism. The text is an edited compilation similar to 
Victor Ullman's text. It focuses on providing a historical account of the writings of these 
men and a glimpse of their lives, but does not make the connection as to how their early 
writings informed and influenced the development of future black nationalists leaders 
across generations. 
In 1976, Robert Williams published Negroes With Guns, a short history of the 
founding and activities of the Deacons for Defense surrounding the incident that led him 
to flee the United States in 1961. Along with Malcolm X, Robert Williams was 
considered the father of modem black nationalism by many black nationalists of the 
Black Power Era. He was the first public figure to openly support blacks' right to self- 
defense and follow through with the organizing of a para-military group. The text 
hghlights the success of Williams and his para-military group in putting an end to the 
violence of the Ku Klux Klan that was notorious for terrorizing the black community in 
Monroe, North Carolina. 
The text Black Separatism in the United States was published by Raymond Hall 
in 1978. It is a comparative study of several black nationalist organizations (Congress of 
Racial Equality, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, Black Panther Party for 
Self-Defense, Republic of New Africa, and the Nation of Islam). Hall presents a brief 
history of each organization, its ideological position on black liberation and the 
development of independent statehood, along with each organizations' economic strategy 
and program. He conlpares each organization by presenting their particular views and 
programs on how to achieve black liberation either through establishing their own 
national territory, or at least controlling the economics, politics, and culture of their own 
communities. However, Hall provides no analysis. He simply categorizes these black 
nationalist organizations as separatist, based upon their stated political and economic 
objectives, along with their exclusion of white participation within their membership. 
Hall provides the reader with a basic understanding of each organization's political, 
economic, and social program, and demonstrates how they differed and how they were 
similar to each other. He does so, however, without offering any criticism or insight into 
their strengths and weaknesses. 
During the 1980s, Tony Martin published his definitive work, Race First in 1986, 
highlighting the life and work of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement 
Association (UNIA). The text provides a very detailed account of the history and public 
life of Garvey and the UNIA. Martin does a thorough job of discussing the internal and 
external circumstances that surrounded the work of Garvey and the UNIA. He presents 
demographic information on the many organizational chapters of the UNIA that spanned 
throughout the United States, the Caribbean, and Africa. He also sheds light on the 
"Back-to-Africa" slogan so closely associated with Marcus Garvey to correct the notion 
that Garvey intended for all African-Americans to repatriate back to Africa. 
James Cone revived the literary interest in black nationalism, in 1992, with his 
publication of Martin and Malcolm and America. Cone does an excellent job of 
discussing the two polar opposite viewpoints of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr, and Malcolm 
X. His presentation is fair and insightful, and is one of the first texts to provide an 
analysis of black nationalist thinking through the experiences and words of Malcolm X. 
Although the text is not devoted exclusively to the topic of black nationalism, its critique 
and analysis of the two dominant ideological positions among African-Americans makes 
it a significant contribution to the literature on black nationalism. 
In 1994, William Sales took the discussion further with his publication, From 
Civil Rights to Black Liberation Malcolm X and the Organization of AJi.0-American 
Unity. Sales, details the progression of Malcolm X from his days as a minister in the 
NO1 to his independent work as the leading black nationalist theorist of his day. The 
major contribution of Sales' work is his demonstration of the link between Malcolm X 
and the generation of black nationalist leaders and organizations that developed after his 
death. Sales outlines Malcolm X's ideas on the issues of land, political independence, 
Pan-Africanism, and socialism, then proceeds to demonstrate the connection that leaders 
and organizations of the Black Power Era had to those ideas in the development of their 
programs and agendas. 
The following year in 1995, Abiola Sinclaire published The Harlem Cultural- 
Political Movements. The value of this text lies in its depth of research on black 
nationalist history that had been overlooked. Siriclaire makes it a point to bring to light 
the smaller and less well-known black nationalist organizations that existed during the 
1930s-1960s. He traces the history of the Harlem nationalist movement back to the 
UNIA and gives a history of the men and women who continued the work of Garvey and 
the UNIA after Garvey was deported. One special aspect of the text is that it provides an 
account of the social context that existed and aided Malcolm X in developing his skills as 
an orator, based upon his observance of black nationalist spokespersons presenting their 
platforms and programs to blacks on the streets of Harlem. Sinclaire demonstrates the 
connection between Malcolm X's appeal as a fiery orator and his predecessor Carlos 
Cooks. The text also presents a wealth of photographs documenting the era. 
In 1996, both Wilson Moses and Robert Carlisle published texts on black 
nationalism.. Moses' text, Classical Black Nationalism, is an edited compilation of 
primary sources outlining the early history and literature of black nationalism. Moses 
documents the history of black nationalism as it developed from the early 1800s through 
the first two decades of the twentieth century. One of the major contributions of 
Moses' Classical Black Nationalism is that he identifies three distinct periods in the 
developnient of black nationalism. According to Moses, the first period is classical black 
nationalism, which began in the early 1800s with the work of Paul Cuffe, Wilmot 
Blyden, and Alexander Crun~n-iell to relocate free blacks back to Africa, and ends in the 
late 1920s with the imprisonment of Marcus Garvey and the subsequent demise of the 
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). This period would also be inclusive 
of the maroons and slave insurrections during the antebellum period, which are not 
mentioned by Moses. The second period of black nationalism is called modem black 
nationalism, which begins with the founding of the Moorish American Science Temple, 
in 1924, by Noble Drew Ali and the Nation of Islam, in 1932, by Elijah Muhammad, and 
also includes the Harlem and Chicago nationalist traditions that developed in response to 
continuing the legacy and teachings of Marcus Garvey. The third period is identified as 
the passing of the torch from Malcolm X to the black nationalist organizations and 
movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, commonly referred to as the Black Power 
Era. 
According to Moses, another distinction made between the classical and modem 
period is that the cultural ideals of nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalists 
were more in line with those of upper-class Europeans and whites, rather than those of 
native Africans or the black masses. He states that early nationalists were influenced 
greatly by the cultural aesthetic of high European society, which was devoutly Christian, 
imperialistic, aristocratic, and militaristic.' This was markedly different from the black 
nationalism born during the Harlem Renaissance, which uplifted the cultural pride that 
blacks had in both their southern and African cultural roots. 
Robert Carlisle published, The Roots of Black Nationalism, in 1996, which goes 
into greater detail concerning the development of black nationalist movements. Carlisle 
discusses in detail the emergence of Paul Cuffe and the emigrationist movement that led 
to the founding of Liberia and continues through the early years of the Black Power Era. 
The text does shed light on lesser, well-known figures in black nationalist history, such as 
Daniel J. Flumrner and Alfi-ed C. Sam who were organizers of the emigration movement, 
along with Bishop Henry McNeal Turner during post-reconstruction and into the early 
twentieth century. 
Also, according to Carlisle, the classical period was not only defined by time 
constructs. He states that early nationalism had an international character due to the 
influence of the Liberian Movement and Paul Cuffe's repatriation efforts to Sierre 
~ e o n e . ~  The impact of the Haitian revolution and the emigration and settlement of free 
blacks in Mexico and Canada also played a role in giving early nationalist efforts an 
international scope.. 
Within the past decade, two major texts on the topic of black nationalism are 
edited compilations of articles written by various authors. Black Power in the Belly oj'the 
Beast, published, in 2006, and edited by Judson L. Jeffries, presents articles exploring the 
history of black nationalist organizations during the Black Power Era (BPE). The text 
includes articles on the Deacons for Defense, the Republic of New Africa (RNA), the 
League of Revolutionary Black Workers, the Black Liberation Army (BLA), and the 
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM). Each article gives a brief synopsis of the 
history of each organization, key figures, and significant events relevant to the historical 
period of the BPE. The research presented goes more in-depth into the specific ideas and 
approaches each organization utilized to advance their particular black nationalist 
program. The research is also significant because it highlights organizations that 
traditionally have been overlooked in the study of black nationalism. The articles, 
however, do not present any criticism or analysis of the organizations, their leadership, 
plans, and/or strategies. 
In the introduction, Jeffries offers some criticism and analysis of the BPE,. He 
provides insight into the rejection of Christianity by black power advocates and its 
consequences when he states that, ". . . Christianity did not play a prominent role in the 
Black Power Movement like it did in the Civil Rights Movement . . . . None of the 
commonly known leaders of the movement manifested a positive view of ~hristianity."~ 
He then explains the result of the rejection of Christianity by stating that, "Black 
Nationalists took the wrong position of heightening people's consciousness with history 
and political theory without spiritual-moral development and principals to guide them 
and maintain a spiritual connection-foundation."' Jeffiies, however, does not elaborate as 
to how this impacted the success and/or failure of the Black Power Movement and why 
this phenomena existed among the many black nationalist organizations. 
One of the major reasons for the sparse texts and articles that offer criticism and 
analysis on the subject of black nationalism is the practice of "avoidance" in academia 
concerning the topic of black nationalism. William L.Van Deburg makes this point in his 
edited work, Modern Black Nationalism--From Marcus Garvey to Louis Farrakhan, 
published in 1997. When writing about how the subject of black nationalism is treated in 
academia he states that "Many U.S. history texts--at all levels--practice avoidance." The 
implication is that the topic of black nationalism is, to a certain degree, taboo. This may 
be a result of its conflicting position with the American establishment and status quo. 
The subject of black nationalism often challenges the American ideal as being 
hypocritical when it comes to Afiican-Americans and their status in American society, 
therefore, it has been avoided as a major topic even in the study of African-American 
history. Jeffries capsulizes this problem between academia and black nationalism: 
Scholarly materials on the Black Power Movement are not as abundant. One 
scholar has noted that American history texts published in the 1980s, for 
example, for both secondary-school and college audiences devoted an average 
between two and four paragraphs, or less than one page, to the Black Power 
Movement. The more substantive works on this subject were published long 
before the movement ended. Consequently, there is no comprehensive analysis of 
the Black Power ~ o v e m e n t . . ~  
The current edited works either present secondary historical accounts of black 
nationalism or primary source information based on organizational documents and 
individual writings. This has created a problem in the study of black nationalism because 
the majority of the literature seldom moves beyond presenting historical data and into the 
realm of critical analysis. This has prevented scholars from being able to create a 
fundamental understanding of the critical issues faced by black nationalists in their 
attempt to achieve their goals. 
In reviewing the literature on black nationalism, one finds that there is also the 
practical problem of defining black nationalism. A few examples of definitions given by 
authors on the subject will illustrate this point. In, Slave Culture Nationalist Theory and 
Foundations oJBlack America, published in 1987, Sterling Stuckey proposes that 
nationalism is, ". . . a belief in racial solidarity, self-help, and the idea that Blacks share a 
common destiny."10 In 2001, Dean Robinson, author of Black Nationalism in American 
Politics and Thought, states that nationalism is ". . . to include both those who favored 
separate statehood, as well as, self-help identified 'nationalists' who supported the more 
modest goal of Black administration of vital private and public institutions."" Raymond 
Hall, in Black Separatists, writes that "Black Nationalism stems from the idea of racial 
solidarity, implies that blacks should organize themselves on the basis of their common 
experience of oppression as a result of their blackness, culture, and AErican 
heritage."12 E.U. Essien-Udom, author of Black Nationalism--A Search for Identity in 
America, suggests that nationalism is ". . . the effort of thousands of American Negroes to 
resolve for themselves the fundamental problem of identity and provide a context for 
their moral, cultural, and material advancement within the limits set by the American 
scene."I3 Obviously each author has a personal view of what constitutes black 
nationalism. As such, almost all activities and leaders who have been involved in the 
fight against oppression, such as, enslavement, discrimination, racial violence and racial 
uplift are discussed within the context of black nationalism. 
The fight against oppression or the fight for African-American liberation does not 
necessarily translate, in the author's view, into black nationalism. Wilson Moses gives a 
more concise definition of black nationalism that helps to determine those organizations, 
leaders, and movements that developed programs, strategies, and tactics for the purpose 
of advancing the ultimate goal of black nationalism. Wilson defines black nationalism as 
". . . an ideology whose goal was the creation of an autonomous black nation-state, 
with definite geographic boundaries, usually in ~ f r i c a . " ' ~  This is undoubtedly the most 
concise and useful definition of black nationalism to date as it helps scholars delineate 
which organizations, leaders, and movements must be examined when one seeks to 
understand the evolution of this ideology and its accompanying social programs. 
Juxtaposed against this definition, a review of the literature also exposes what is 
not black nationalism. Many organizations, leaders, and activities have been 
misinterpreted as black nationalist when they are more correctly defined as black 
liberationists, who demand freedom from all forms of oppression. The problem of 
defining black nationalism stems from the logic that if and when black nationalism is 
achieved, then, black liberation is also achieved. Conversely, the logic that if and when 
black liberation is achieved, then, black nationalism is achieved is not true, however, 
black liberation does not equate to independent autonomous statehood. Only black 
nationalism, by definition, equates to independent autonomous statehood. 
In Raymond Hall's text, Black Separatists in the United States, this problem of 
definition is exposed thoroughly. Hall identifies six sub-categories of black nationalism: 
cultural, religious, economic, bourgeois reformism (community control), revolutionary, 
and territorial separation.'' Only territorial separation meets the criteria of Moses' 
definition. This is due to the gross misuse of the word "nationalism", by referring to 
activities and organizations whose goals did not intend to achieve an independent 
autonomous state, but were focused on a particular strategy or tactic to achieve black 
liberation. All of these organizations utilized similar tactics and strategies, but not all of 
them explicitly advocated the establishment of an independent autonomous black nation- 
state. 
Those individuals and organizations that have a stated purpose and objective of 
the realization of an independent sovereign nation governed by black people have 
incorporated some or all of the other five sub-categories listed above as a means to the 
ultimate goal of black statehood. This has tended to lead many authors to conclude that 
these activities alone are nationalist. This has created a distortion in the study of black 
nationalism, making the subject too broad and inclusive, thereby limiting the depth with 
which black nationalism has been studied. Although the organizations discussed in 
Hall's text have contributed to the advancement of black liberation in support of black 
nationalist objectives, an analysis of their tactics and strategies is necessary to determine 
how they have explicitly and/or implicitly contributed to the advancement toward 
achieving the goal of an independent nation for black people. 
Without a clear definition and subsequent delineation of the tactics and strategies 
as related to the achievement of the overall goal, it is impossible to offer intelligent 
criticism of black nationalist organizations and leadership. Dean Robinson corroborates 
this position: "By understanding Black Nationalism as an affective state, or as any form 
of racial solidarity, scholars have often glossed over many significant distinctions and 
outright conflicts among historical agents."16 The result has been that the literature 
becomes redundant without providing insight into the problems and issues that black 
nationalists have had in achieving the goal of independent statehood. If everyone who 
works to uplift black people can be regarded as a nationalist, then nationalism is reduced 
to a strategy to resist oppression, instill pride and hope, and build a cornion bond among 
black people; this is in no way reflective of the magnitude and objective of creating an 
independent nation-state, or helpful in determining what has and has not worked and 
why. It is important, however, to mention that, in the case of the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee and the Council of Racial Equality discussed in Hall's text, both 
organizations began as Civil Rights organizations fighting for integration and then 
switched to black nationalists positions during the Black Power Era. 
After reviewing the literature on black nationalism, I have discovered serious gaps 
in the study. The majority of authors deal with the ideology of black nationalism and the 
historical occurrences related to the development of organizations, its leadership, 
important events, and the rise and decline of movements. This author was only able to 
find one comparative study, which was very limited. Raymond Hall, in Black 
Separatists, gives a comparative analysis of five "nationalist" organizations: the Nation 
of Islam, Council on Racial Equality, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the 
Black Panther Party, and the Republic of New Africa. Although Hall provides 
information about the history of each organization and why he has labeled them 
separatists, he provides no comparative analysis of strategies, tactics, or operations that 
determined the success of one organization versus another. 
There are a few studies related to the lives of individual leaders of particular 
movements that add to one's scholarly understanding of black nationalist ideology. 
Elaine Brown provides an in-depth look into the inner worlungs of the Black Panther 
Party in her autobiography, Taste o j ~ o w e r , ' ~  and Hugh Pearson contributes to the inside 
story of the Black Panthers in his biography on Huey Newton, The Shadow o j  the 
panther.18 Tony Martin does the same with Marcus Garvey in The Race,19 and Alex 
Haley contributes greatly to the understanding of the personal life of Malcolm x.~' One 
of the most recently published autobiographies is that of Stokley Carmichael titled, Ready 
For Revolution Carmichael, like the aforementioned black nationalist leaders, takes the 
reader through his own experiences in the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements, but 
also provides a great deal of critical analysis of the issues and problems faced by 
organizations and leaders in both movements. As an insider, he is able to bridge the gap 
between the internal politics of organizations and movements with the external conditions 
that these organizations attempted to change. For example, he provides the background 
to the development of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense from his early 
interactions with Huey Newton and Bobby Seale. The friction that existed between the 
three revealed a problem among black nationalist leaders in their inability to work 
through personality issues early on in the development of the Black Power Movement. 
Carmichael's personal experience provides fertile ground for new research in areas not 
yet discussed in the literature. The power-relationships among black nationalist leaders 
during the BPE is one of many topics that needs more research and discussion. Although 
limited to the personal lives of individuals, autobiographies reveal and present 
tremendous insight into issues faced by black nationalists during their respective 
historical periods. The limitation is that they lack, along with other writings on the 
subject, in-depth analysis and criticism on the inconsistencies of strategies and tactics 
employed, long range plans to achieve a nationalist state, and a much-needed explanation 
as to why organizations have failed to carry out the manifestation of an independent 
sovereign black state. 
What scholars have to date is a history of black nationalism that identifies key 
movements, organizations, leaders, and events, along with a plethora of commentary on 
the ideology of black nationalism as it relates to its function and survival in the context of 
the American political and social systems. An example of the lack of in-depth analysis in 
the literature on black nationalism is found in Moses' text, Classical Black Nationalism, 
where he speaks of the waxing and waning of the black nationalist movement in the 
history of African-Americans. Moses briefly outlines the rise and decline of mass 
support for black nationalism from the late 1700s through the 1960s. He 
states that there was a protonationalistic phase in the late 1700s, a hiatus in the 1830s, 
flourishing in the 1850s, an eclipse in the 1870s, an apex in the Garvey Movement, and a 
comparatively feeble recrudescence in the 1960s. He ties the waxing and waning of mass 
popular support for black nationalism to the hope and aspirations prevalent at the time for 
blacks to be included as part of the American mainstream, but says little else on the 
subject.21 There is no discussion of how black nationalism continued in the midst of lost 
mass popular support. What work was continued to advance black nationalism when the 
majority of blacks were pushing and putting their hopes into gaining entry into the 
American mainstream, and what factors led to the return of mass popular support? These 
questions alone deserve detailed analysis to give the subject of black nationalism the 
respect of being studied from various angles to penetrate the many nuances that have 
affected its existence as a major component of African-American history, thought, and 
activity. 
Clearly, there is a need for more critical analysis of black nationalism. 
Delineating the many organizations, movements, strategies, and tactics employed to 
acheve black liberation is a first step in being able to provide a deeper analysis of black 
nationalism. The next requirement is to determine the significance of each organization, 
movement, strategy, and tactic in relation to furthering the goal of the black nationalist 
objective of independent statehood. In doing so, the study of black nationalism will go 
beyond identification and definition and begin to explore the reasons for its failure and 
better understand what is necessary for its success. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY BLACK NATIONALISM 
In the strictest sense, black nationalism began in Africa. The political, economic, 
and social history of Africa displays a continuous movement of the rise and decline of 
various nation-states, beginning with the development of the ancient empires of Meroe, 
Axum, Ethiopia, Sudan, and  hami it.' These early states were characterized by a highly 
developed centralized authority, usually a reigning priest-king with the support of a priest 
class acting as spiritual-religious leaders, advisors, governors, and administrators of 
 institution^.^ The pharaoh dynasties of Ethiopia and Khamit have been recorded to date 
as far back as 10,000 years before the birth of Christ, and the reign of indigenous African 
rulers went uninterrupted until the eighteenth century B.C., after the invasion of the 
~ ~ k s o s . ~  
The accomplishments of these ancient nation-states-including Ghana, Mali, and 
Songhay-have influenced every area of civilization including agriculture, religion, 
military science, art, and .4 The significance of the development of these 
ancient civilizations with regard to the development of black nationalism is that they 
provide a foundation and a legacy of national existence and nation building that began 
with Ethiopia and Khamit and continued in West Africa where the majority of Africans 
enslaved in America originated. 
The significance of the history of African nation-states and empires to 
understanding black nationalism in the U.S. has been greatly underestimated. This is 
very clear when one considers that the majority of authors on the subject of black 
nationalism made no attempt to recognize that Africans enslaved in America came from 
long-standing, well-organized nations and how that reality has played a role in the 
continuing development of black nationalism in America. The practice and motive to be 
independent and self-governing is rooted in African people's cultural tradition of nation 
and empire building. In the majority of literature on black nationalism, it is discussed as 
a reactionary alternative to the injustices blacks faced in trying to exercise their human 
and civil rights in American society, without any regard for Afiican people's inherent 
desire and proven capability to build a nation and govern themselves. When one 
considers the cultural and political history of Afi-ican people, it is only logical that they 
would seek to continue the tradition of nation building in America, being directed and 
guided by their traditions of nationhood, rather than by a reactionary motive to escape 
oppression or failure to be included as equals to whites in American society. 
Due to the extensive development of nation building and establishmexit of 
national identities by West Africans throughout history, beginning with Ghana before the 
Christian era and continuing through the enslavement period, Africans enslaved and 
brought to America sought to continue their traditions of nation building as independent 
and free people organizing to govern themselves. Clearly, the first step in maintaining a 
sense of nationality and independence as political realities was to break away from the 
physical bondage of enslavement. This is another research topic that authors on the 
subject of black nationalism have neglected. Black nationalism is rarely related to the 
resistance and revolting of enslaved Africans against the institution of enslavement. 
Classical black nationalism begins with free blacks in the north, but there is no 
corresponding classical period for blacks in the south. A critical piece to the 
development of black nationalism is the organized and unorganized-but continuous-- 
resistance and revolt against enslavement for the purpose of not only ending their 
physical bondage, but also meeting a basic requirement of building a nation, which is the 
ability to defend and maintain freedom. 
The defending and maintaining of African freedom in America was the most 
critical issue for which black nationalist had to find a solution. For enslaved Afiicans and 
quasi-free Africans in America, the inability to properly defend and maintain African 
freedom was a key factor in why there has not been a direct link made between African 
resistance and revolt against enslavement and black nationalism. With this in mind, 
AfPican resistance and revolt against enslavement was not only a primary factor in the 
development of black nationalism, but, indeed, it preceded the possibility of the 
establishment of a black nation-state by Africans in America. Resistance and revolt 
against enslavement, more than the convention activities and colonization resettlement 
activities of quasi-free blacks in the north, served as the foundational root of black 
nationalism in America. 
Enslavement was in direct opposition not only to freedom, but also to nation 
building. An enslaved people cannot effectively build a nation for themselves; therefore, 
the first priority in the development of black nationalism was the destruction of the 
enslavement system and the establishment of resources to sustain freedom and 
independence in a hostile environment. In order to accomplish this, Africans enslaved in 
the south resisted and revolted against their enslavement on a daily basis, and those who 
were successful formed independent families and communities to exercise their 
independence and organize themselves into the basic elements of a nation-family 
and community. 
The formation of independent families and communities took place in both the 
north and the south. In the north, the blacks of Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and 
other northern urban centers acted independently to meet their own needs; to do so, they 
formed Mutual Aid Societies, built freedom schools, and established churches, all under 
the guise of a false fieedom and while fighting against the injustices that plagued black 
life. In the south, the line and cost of freedom was not disguised and created an 
atmosphere for resistance and revolt to develop as an integral part of black nationalist 
ideology and practice. These independent families and communities in the south were 
called maroons, but were also referred to as "outlyers" by the United States government 
The presence of maroons and outlyers throughout the enslavement period represents the 
first efforts made by groups of once-enslaved Africans to establish territories for their 
own independence. The larger and more successful maroons existed in South America 
and the Caribbean, but Africans brought to the U.S. established smaller settlements and 
communities throughout the south, particularly in swamp areas.5 The formation of 
lziaroon communities serves as the highest level of development of black nationalism in 
the United States during the enslavement period. Considering that the vast majority of 
Africans in the U.S. during the antebellum period were either enslaved or nominally free, 
maroons were the only group of Africans who stood outside of the American 
establishment and lived as truly independent free people, living by their own laws, 
choosing their own leaders, and building their own institutions. The five most important 
features of maroons were: 1) they waged guerilla warfare against the enslavement 
system, 2) their existence was prevalent throughout the entire enslavement era in the 
U.S., 3) they checked the absoluteness of white American power arid control over black 
peoples' lives, 4) they provided a tangible existence of African freedom that served as a 
reminder to both blacks and their enslavers that African people still held on to the cultural 
tradition of being independent and self-governing, and 5) they were willing to fight and 
defend their independence. 
In Maroons, Herbert Aptheker suggests that over 50 maroon communities existed 
in the 1J.S. during the enslavement period, from 1672 to 1 864.6 The largest of the 
maroon communities to exist in the U.S. was that of the Dismal Swamp lying between 
the borders of southeast Virginia and North Carolina, increasing to a population of 2,500 
men, women, and children, some of whom were believed to have lived out their entire 
lives in the Dismal Swamp. Aptheker goes on to state that, ". . . a settled life, rather than 
a pugnacious and migratory one, was aimed at, as is evidenced by the fact that these 
maroons built homes, maintained families, raised cattle, and pursued agriculture . . . ."7 
In specific cases, maroons built forts and organized militarily to defend themselves 
against capture and enslavement, as well as to execute offensive campaigns against the 
enslavement system. 
Vincent Harding provides evidence in There Is A River of maroon development 
beginning as early as the 1650s when reports were made in Virginia of fugitive Africans 
attempting "to form small armed groups in various sections of the colony and to harass 
neighboring plantations, at the same time creating bases to which others might flee . . . ."' 
The military, state governments, and local newspapers of the era provide substantial 
evidence that maroons were a constant threat to white enslavers and to the stability of the 
enslavement system. As early as 1672, the Virginia House of Burgess urged and 
rewarded the hunting down and killing of maroons.' In 1768, South Carolina waged a 
battle against a substantial number of maroons, which included mulattoes, mustees, free 
blacks, and native Africans. In 1816, the U.S. army dispatched troops against a maroon 
fort located on the Appalachiola Bay with a population of over three hundred  person^.'^ 
As late as 1864, an account is given by a Union Army officer that over 500 Union men 
(deserters) and maroons were raiding and threatening several of the cities in ~1orida.l 
The majority of accounts identi@ing maroons came as a result of maroon activity 
that became an open threat to the enslavement system. Whites often complained of the 
existence of bands of maroons who were plundering their plantations, stealing food, 
supplies, weapons, and ammunition. Maroons also remained a constant aggravation to 
the enslavement population due to their activities of recruiting other Africans to join their 
cormiunities and assist them in fighting against the enslavement system. The statement 
that maroons were ". . . at the same time creating bases to which others might flee" 
supports the idea that maroons were not simply outlaws living as nomads, but were 
seeking to establish a permanent and defensible independence. 
The legacy of African people governing themselves and establishing their 
independence and control of their own territory was kept alive by maroons. At no point 
in U.S. history did Africans give up their desire to be free, govern themselves, and 
establish a nation of their own. For over two hundred years, a substantial number of 
Africans lived in their own communities, free from the rule of white Americans. 
Maroons built homes and forts, farmed, raised livestock, had children, elected leaders, 
formed militias, and even traded with neighboring whites and Native Americans. In 
essence, maroons practiced the basic activities of an independent people necessary for the 
development of a nation. 
Under the constant threat of war, maroon communities in the U.S. experienced 
great difficulty establishing a permanent territory and developing large populations. 
Most existed as small villages and mobile settlements. The existence of maroons 
provides a great deal of evidence that the principles of nation building that existed in 
Africa were transported to the shores, hills, and swamps of North America. 
Although maroons represent the highest level of independence ever achieved by 
blacks in America, they were not by far the majority of Africans fighting for freedom, 
independence, and self-governance. Alongside the development of maroon communities 
were the continuous efforts of Africans on and off the plantation involved in planned and 
organized efforts of revolt to overthrow the enslavement system, as well as to establish 
independence for themselves. In 1740, Africans in Maryland had conspired to ". . . 
destroy his majesty's Subjects within the Province, and to possess themselves of the 
whole ~ountry." '~ During that same year near Charleston, S.C., a plot was uncovered by 
whites in which Africans had planned ". . . to break into the Charleston arsenal and then 
take over the city."13 
The idea of gaining access to the arsenals and armories and then taking over a 
specific area became relatively common themes in many of the revolts planned by 
Africans. It was the goal of obtaining complete independence and wanting to make sure 
that they could defend that independence that led Africans to conclude that they must ". . 
. possess themselves of the whole Country." In doing so, Africans were demonstrating a 
sincere commitment to continuing their existence as an independent people, and once 
they had conceived of controlling a specific territory, the implication is that it would 
become a national territory for African independence, which could then develop into an 
African state and nation. It had been done in Haiti and in many parts of the Caribbean 
and South America. Although it was not accomplished in the U.S., the intent of revolt 
and resistance was the same as that of those Africans in the Caribbean and South 
America. 
As enslaved Africans revolted against their enslavers and continued to seek out 
means of gaining their independence from Europeans, they made use of their 
relationships with maroons. It was recognized among white authorities and enslavers that 
the existence and close proximity of maroon communities promoted revolts and made 
insurrections more difficult to defeat. l4  In the case of the revolts of Denmark Vessey and 
Nat Turner, these suspicions didn't go unchecked. It was believed by Governor Bennett 
of South Carolina in 1822 that Denmark Vessey had enlisted the help of ". . . about 
, 7 1 5  twenty maroons from the same region . . . . and the newspapers around Richmond, 
Virginia, during the Nat Turner revolt asked authorities if the rebels were connected to 
the maroons who terrorized North Carolina the previous year. l6  This is very likely, 
co~isidering Nat Turner ran away often arid spent months at a time living in the Dismal 
Swamp region of South Hampton, virginia.17 Surely, Turner's knowledge and long stays 
in the Dismal Swamp put him in contact with maroons who had made the swamp their 
pernianent home. In developing his strategy for insurrection, Turner had included the 
option of retreating to Cabin Pond if his forces were unable to conquer and secure the city 
of Jerusalem and its armory.18 It is well known that Nat Turner had no intention of 
accomplishing less than complete freedom from whites, as he and his men killed an 
estimated 60 to 70 white enslavers and their families. 
The nationalist aims of the three major slave revolts-Gabriel Prosser, Denmark 
Vessey, and Nat Turner- can be seen in the plans made by Africans not only to secure 
their own freedom, but also to establish themselves as independent of all white authority 
or law. Gabriel Prosser had intended "to subdue the whole country where slavery was 
m19 Permitted . . . . During the trials and executions of Africans involved in the Denmark 
Vessey revolt, it was discovered that Monday Gel1 (considered the scribe of the Vessey 
plot) had written a letter to President Boyer of Haiti attempting to establish some 
commitment from the Haitian government that they would ". . . help them if they made 
an effort to free themselves."20 Denmark Vessey had plans of making a national territory 
out of South Carolina or migrating to Haiti. Nat Turner revealed less about his nationalist 
plans, but it was uncovered that one of the objectives of the revolt was to take over the 
armory at Jerusalem, Virginia, and continue to move forward until the entire area had 
been liberated.21 
Gabriel Prosser and Denmark Vessey, according to the historical record, clearly 
identified their goal of establishing an indeperiderit territory as part of their overall 
plans.22 Their plans for African independence reveal that AFricans who revolted against 
enslavement were not simply trying to free themselves from physical bondage, but 
understood it would be necessary to be able to defend that freedom as an independent 
people. In British colonial law and American law, Africans were considered a subjugated 
people, non-citizens, and property of either individuals or the society in the case of 
"quasi-free" blacks. The option of revolting to destroy America's economic base and 
then somehow become a part of the American establishment did not exist. The only 
options that existed were successful independence or certain death. Africans fully 
understood the tremendous consequences of a failed revolt. The number of hangings, 
burnings, and decapitations more than testifjr of the consequences of a failed revolt, but 
they also explicitly reveal the uncompromising stance of whites concerning the illegal 
nature of African independence during enslavement. 
The act of Afiicans seeking independence was treated as a crime of the highest 
nature, punishable by death. The fundamental premise was that African independence 
was against the law. Every level of American society acted to prevent African 
independence at all costs. To revolt came with the understanding that its success meant 
independence not only from one's immediate captor, but also from the society that 
enforces and condones one's captivity. With this in mind, Africans who revolted, even 
on an individual or small group basis, were seeking to establish their independence, 
particularly during the colonial period and before the northern abolition of enslavement, 
at the very cost of their lives. 
To accomplish the task of successful independence, Africans planned to take over 
the military control of a territory by capturing the armory and in most cases slaying all 
the whites. The other options were to retreat to and/or join the ranks of other independent 
people who offered African independence such as the Native Americans or Haitians after 
1804. Again, the goal of revolting against enslavement was independence--not simply 
physical freedom. Africans who revolted against enslavement did riot consider the option 
of joining the American establishment as free men and women who had defeated their 
enslavers because they understood that ultimately it was the American establishment, 
through the use of the U.S. military and courts, who protected and sanctioned their 
enslavement.. Africans who revolted understood that freedom meant independence, and 
independence meant the right to nationhood. 
Another avenue Africans followed toward gaining independence and self- 
government was to leave the U.S. and seek to form colonies and settlements in Africa, 
Canada, South America, and the Caribbean. The colonization work of Paul Cuffe is well 
documented, and for most scholars serves as the definitive beginning of classical black 
nationalism in the u . s . ~ ~  Cuffe established himself as a colonizationist and repatriationist 
in his efforts to promote the return of Africans 'to the land of their fathers' as a means of 
providing Africans with the opportunity to become an independent, self-governing 
people, and for the uplifiment and civilization of Africa. 
Cuffe became interested in the idea of emigration for Africans in the U.S. by way 
of communication with a Mr. James Pemberton, who informed Cuffe of the work being 
done to resettle Africans from the Diaspora in a British colony on the west coast of 
~ f r i c a . ~ ~  The colony was named Sierre Leone and Cuffe was an avid supporter of "free 
Africans" from the U.S. migrating back to Africa. Cuffe believed that through 
commercial venture and the teaching of Christianity, Africans from the U.S. could help to 
advance African civilization. 
Cuffe was a businessman and much of his work toward the advancement of the 
African race was the result of his seeking opportunities to develop trade between 
Africans in the U.. S. and West Africa. In 1 8 1 1, Cuffe secured papers from England, 
allowing him to trade in Sierre Leone. He helped to establish the Friendly Society of 
Sierre Leone, which was devoted to commerce, and also established a society in the U.S. 
to develop correspondence with the African Institution of England and the Friendly 
Society concerning commercial relations. Through the creation of business opportunities, 
Cuffe believed he could attract property-holding blacks in the U.S. to consider the 
benefits of emigration, and "would visit Africa, and endeavor to promote habits of 
industry, sobriety, and frugality among the natives of the country.."25 In 18 16, Cuffe 
would in fact transport 38 emigrants from the U.S. to Sierre Leone in his own vessel and 
mostly at his own expense.26 
As a nationalist, Cuffe was most effective in establishing the means by which 
Africans could be self-sufficient and self-governing. In promoting the establishment of 
Sierre Leone as a colony for the resettlement of African people, Cuffe believed that 
Africans could develop industries and international trade that would allow Africans to 
become economically independent and able to compete in the industrial revolution. To 
the Friendly Society in Sierre Leone, he advised them "not to give up her [Africa's] 
commercial pursuits, for that is the greatest outlet to her national ad~ancement."~~ Cuffe 
understood early in the development of black nationalism that economics was central to 
the ability of Africans to be a self-governing and independent people. 
Although not considered a theorist on the ideology of black nationalism, Cuffe 
did express views that would later become well-known concepts of black nationalism. He 
believed that Africans in the U.S. had a duty to the upliftment of Africa, as he was ". . . in 
duty bound to escort myself to the uttermost of my ability for the good cause of 
~fr ica ."~ '  Cuffe believed in self-government and sought to promote emigration among 
Africans who, he believed, could serve as leaders in the development of Sierre Leone. 
Richard Allen, Absolorn Jones, James Forten, Prince Saunders, Daniel Coker, and Peter 
Williams were all leaders of the African Institutions Cuffe helped establish in the U.S. 
Many of these men were religious leaders of newly-formed African churches.. They gave 
Cuffe an audience of the most educated and wealthy members of the African community 
in America. 
Colonization and emigration appealed to the nationalist aspirations that many 
Africans held at the turn of the nineteenth century. Africans who had gained their 
freedom began to realize that America was only committed to its creed of being the land 
of the free if one had white skin; thus, for Africans seeking independence and self-rule, 
another area of land was necessary to meet their nationalist objectives.. 
After the success of Paul Cuffe in transporting 38 immigrants to Sierre Leone in 
18 16, white deportationists and colonizationists from the lJ.S. began to consider the 
colonization of "free Africans" more seriously. In 18 17, The American Society for the 
Colonizing of the Free People of Color of The United States (American Colonization 
Society - ACS) was founded.29 Made up of white philanthropists and several enslavers, 
the ACS turned many blacks against the idea of emigration and colonization. Blacks 
viewed the ACS as a means of ridding the population of the most dangerous threat to the 
enslavement system, "free Africans." Throughout the 1820s and 1830s, Africans who 
publicly supported colonization and/or emigrated under the ACS were severely criticized 
and considered traitors to their race." So intense was the mood that James Forten, who 
advocated emigration with Paul Cuffe, switched his position to anti-colonization with the 
founding of the ACS 31 
Even with the decline of popular support for colonization and emigration, 
Africans continued to use emigration as a means of establishing themselves as an 
independent people. In 1820, 39 families, under the auspices of the ACS, set sail from 
New York on the Elizabeth to West Afiica to form what would later become the colony 
of ~ i b e r i a . ~ ~  Upon their arrival they stayed at Campelar, a settlement founded by John 
Kizell, who had formerly been enslaved in South Carolina and had emigrated as a 
founding member of Sierre Leone in 1 792.33 Campelar was under British authority and 
Kizell had been authorized to start the settlement, which was founded in 18 14. Kizell 
was instrumental in helping ACS agents negotiate with indigenous African leaders for the 
land of the Liberian colony. 
The white ACS agents died while completing the negotiations for the land sight, 
and the leadership of the colony fell into the hands of Daniel Coker, who was an emigrant 
on the Elizabeth. Coker was an associate of Cuffe in Baltimore and had emigrated as a 
missionary with support from the Maryland Colonization Society. After assuming 
leadership of the colony and receiving 28 more colonists the following year, Coker 
moved the settlement to Fourah Bay, and then again to Cape Mesurado to distance the 
colony from any British interference. Liberia was founded in 1822 at Cape Mesurado, 
but Coker and a few other colonists decided to return to Sierre Leone. Under the 
leadership of Lott Carey and Elijah Johnson, who had both emigrated with the second 
group of colonists, the colony of Liberia began with a total of 135 African emigrants 
from the U.S. 34 
The founding of Liberia continued the development of the nationalist desire of 
many Africans to achieve self-government. In explaining to his associates why he was 
choosing to emigrate, Lott Carey stated "I am African . . . I wish to go to a country 
where I shall be estimated by my merits - not by my complexion; and I feel bound to 
labor for my suffering race."35 John Russwurm emigrated to Liberia in 1830 under heavy 
criticism, and was burned in e%gy by blacks at a national convention for emigrating 
under the ACS. Russwurm defended his action by stating it was "mere waste of words to 
talk of ever enjoying citizenship in [ ~ m e r i c a ] . " ~ ~  Russwurm went on to become 
governor of the colony in 1836 and maintained his leadership until his death in 185 1 .37 
Later, other Africans with nationalist intentions would continue to ernmigrate to Liberia, 
most notably Alexander Crummell and Edward Wilmot ~ l y d e n . ~ '  
Although many African leaders in the U.S. criticized emigrants to Liberia and saw 
it as being controlled by white financing and the interest of enslavers in the ACS, Liberia 
was a tangible reality of the desire and ability of Africans to govern themselves. In fact, 
Liberia established an early tradition of African leadership, having had a consecutive line 
of bIack colonial governors beginning with Coker, Carey, and Johnson and continuing 
into formal independence in 1848, when Russwurm served as its first president.39 
Among those Africans who did not support emigration, nationalism often took the 
form of rhetoric aimed at inspiring enslaved Africans to revolt against their captors. 
There were also many speeches and other written documents which promoted the idea of 
self-government for Africans in America. In David Walker's Appeal in Four Articles 
(1 829) he states, "Our sufferings will come to an end, in spite of all the Americans this 
side of eternity. Then we will want all the learning and talents among ourselves, and 
perhaps more, to govern our~elves ."~~ In 185 1, Augustus Washington wrote a letter to 
the ACS stating that he was in favor of emigration and the establishment of a black 
state.41 
However, the most noteworthy statement made on behalf of the nationalist cause 
prior to 1850 came fiom Henry Highland Garnet in his "Address to the Slaves." 
Memorable for its fiery rhetoric as a call to the enslaved Africans to rise against their 
captors, the address states "If you must bleed, let it all come at once - rather die freemen, 
than to live to be slavesW.l" Garnet gave his address at a national convention in Buffalo, 
New York in 1843. The most significant aspect of the speech was that it missed by one 
vote from being endorsed as a collective commitment by the convention attendees. As 
Robert Carlisle points out in Roots of Black Nationalism, in missing the endorsement of 
the convention by one vote, one can clearly see a movement within the "free African" 
community toward more militant aspirations than existed in the conventions a decade 
earlier. Carlisle goes on to state that Garnet's speech begins to reveal a rift in the 
leadership of the convention movenient between those who would follow the moral 
suasionist position of Fredrick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison and the more 
radical position of Garnet. The speech would also signal a transformation in Garnet, who 
had opposed emigration early in his career, but by 1848 concluded "I would rather see a 
man free in Liberia than a slave in the United 
After the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, emigration regained support 
among Afjricans in the U.S. The Fugitive Slave Law put every African living in the north 
at risk of being captured and re-enslaved. Out of a pure intent to remain free, Africans 
opted to emigrate to Canada specifically, but support was also given to pIans to emigrate 
to South America, the Caribbean, and to Africa. Emigration to Liberia increased during 
this period in response to the Fugitive Slave Law, but also in recognition of Liberia's 
independence in 1848. The decade of the 1850s saw 40,000 Africans migrate to Canada 
alone. The increased interest in emigration led to the founding of several organizations 
geared toward promoting the migration of Afiicans to Canada, Liberia, and Haiti. In 
185 1, Lewis H. Putnam organized the United African Republic Emigration Society in 
New York. In support of his activities, Wesley Jones of Alabarna wrote "I trust my 
brethren will think of this matter and arouse themselves . . . pride be kindled up in their 
hearts and go to make us a great nation of our own, build our own cities and towns, make 
our own laws collect our own revenues . . . . "44 The following year, Martin R. Delaney 
would publish The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the Colored People 
of the United States, PoEitically Considered, in which he writes that Africans in the U.S. 
are, in fact, a nation similar to the various stateless minorities in the nations of Europe, 
and suggested that Africans should seek a national territory.45 
In 1854, leading emigrationists James Holly, Henry Bibb, Martin Delaney, and 
James Whitfield called a convention in Cleveland, 0hio." Delaney gave a speech in 
which he called for the creation of a black empire in the New World, where "the inherent 
traits, attributes . . . and native characteristics peculiar to our race could be cultivated and 
developed."47 The convention commissioned Delaney, Holly, and Whitfield to explore 
possible sites for emigration. Whitfield was sent to explore sights in South America, 
IIolly went to Haiti, and Delaney began negotiations with Jamaica, Cuba, and a number 
of republics in Central and South America. The emigration convention was held again in 
1856, but no one particular location was endorsed by the convention as home of a new 
black nation. In 1858, the convention met in Chatham, Canada, in which Delaney won 
support for his plans to explore the Niger region of Africa. In 1855, Henry Garnet 
returned to the U.S. after lecturing for several years in England. He formed the African 
Civilization Society, which stated within its mission the "civilization and christianization 
of Africa'ks its main purpose.48 
With the return of Garnet to the U.S., a true nationalist camp developed. 
Emigration was the foremost method agreed upon by its leadership to bring about the 
formation of an independent African nation for Africans living in the U.S. Although 
there was some discussion of a land site within the territory of the U.S., the main focus 
and activities were directed outside the U.S. In 1859, Robert Campbell and Martin 
Delaney sailed separately to Africa on expeditions to investigate the prospect of 
resettlement of Africans from the U.S. Delaney first visited Liberia and Campbell went to 
the Niger The two men met in what is now Nigeria and toured the Yoruba 
country. Delaney and Campbell signed a treaty with African officials "as commissioners 
in behalf of the African race in America" to settle "in common with the Egba people, on 
any part of the territory belonging to Abeokuta , not otherwise occupied."50 After 
returning in 1860, Delaney stated, "I have determined to leave my children the 
inheritance of a country, the possession of a territorial domain, the blessing of a national 
education, and the indisputable right of self-government . . . ."" Delaney never fulfilled 
his vision of emigration due to the outbreak of the Civil War. 
Delaney, as well as many other emigrationists, abandoned the project of searching 
for a national territory for blacks in the U..S. to close ranks with other Afiican-American 
leaders in their call for black men to join the Union Army as the most effective and 
expedient means of destroying the enslavement system, and achieving freedom within the 
American establishment. The abandonment of the pursuit of a national territory outside 
the U.S. would severely hamper the emigrationist movement that would re-emerge fifteen 
years later. 
By the close of the Civil War, most African-American leaders hoped the defeat of 
the Confederacy would mean that blacks would receive the status of full citizenship in the 
U.S. The promise of reconstruction, indeed radical reconstruction, faded quickly as the 
compromise to elect President Hayes removed federal troops from the south and left the 
political doors open to return Confederate leaders to power.52 The resurgence of the Ku 
Klux Klan and violence against Africans in the south brought back a resurgence of 
emigrationist ideas that sought to establish an independent African territory for Africans 
in the U.S. 
Beginning in 1877 and continuing through 19 14, there were several emigrationist 
movements organized in the U.S. Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, who was elected 
president of the American Colonization Society in 1876, was involved in one of the first 
emigration movements following reconstruction. In 1877, the Liberian Exodus Joint 
Stock Steamship Company was formed in Charleston, South Carolina. As white 
supremacists began to make their way back to power, interest in emigration to Liberia 
grew. In January 1878, blacks interested in migrating to Liberia began to arrive in 
Charleston, and in April of the same year, 206 emigrants left for Liberia aboard the Azor. 
Bishop Turner was a great advocate and supporter of Liberian emigration and stated that 
"If a line of steamers were started from New Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, or Charleston, 
they would be crowded to density every trip they made to ~ f r i c a . " ~ ~  
During the 1880s and 1890s, emigration remained strong among African- 
Americans in the U.S. The establishment of the Congo Free State led to the creation of 
the United States and Congo National Emigration Company, which was initially 
organized by whites, but was turned over to black shareholders when white financial 
interest dwindled. Benjamin Gaston sewed as its recruiting agent and toured the 
southeast and gulf region [United States] to stir interest in emigration. In 1893-1 894, the 
company sponsored three trips to Liberia, totaling 89 emigrants.54 The International 
Migration Society sponsored a small steamer called the Horsa with 200 passengers to 
Liberia in 1895, and the following year the same organization sent another 321 
emigrants.55 
The support and response to emigration was so high during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries that in 1891 African freedmen from Oklahoma sold their farms 
and left by train for New York in hopes of migrating to Liberia. Other groups of Africans 
fiom Arkansas joined the Oklahoma group in New York, but the expected ship never 
arrived and the almost defunct ACS found itself in a hostile crisis.56 As late as 1914, 
Alfred C. Sam, a native of the Gold Coast, transported 60 Africans from Oklahoma to the 
Gold Coast in a ship he purchased by selling shares in the Akim Trading Company, 
Limited. When he departed from Galveston, Texas, there were 500 African-Americans 
hoping to migrate upon the ship's return and another 500 encamped in a nearby town 
expecting to migrate in the near future." 
Several African-Americans became the victim of false reports, fraudulent 
promoters, and conlpanies that failed to raise the necessary funds to fulfill their contracts. 
The large number of blacks who responded to emigrationist propaganda reveals the 
extent to which emigration was a mass movement. In deciding to migrate to Liberia, the 
Congo, or the Gold Coast, black people surely had a sense that they were not simply 
leaving the U.S., but were clearly interested in living under a government corltrolled and 
determined by African people. The rhetoric of Bishop Turner and Edward Blyden spoke 
of African-Americans from the U.S. returning to Africa as a mission to uplift the African 
race, provide proof of the ability of African people to govern themselves, and serve as a 
source of pride to Africans throughout the Diaspora. 
Emigration as a strategy to achieve the nationalist objective of creating an 
independent nation reached its peak at a time when African-Americans had failed to 
achieve recognition as equal citizens and were seeking to gain protection of their freedom 
and the ability to be governed by themselves and their own people. Emigration seemed 
to be the logical choice, but it was not easily affordable. Family circumstances did not 
always support migrating to a new land, and plans did not always go through. For the 
majority of Africans who remained in America, nationalism would have to become a 
way of life, even if there was no tangible nation-state. The nationalism that sprung up to 
replace the emigrationist movement was designed to correct the lies and theories of 
African inferiority that had flourished in the mid 1800s and had become a "rnatter-of- 
fact" notion among whites by the early 1900s. The nationalists of the 1920s began to 
focus less on trying to return to Africa physically and more on continuing the cultural 
traditions of African people and building institutions to support the needs of the 
community. These men and women believed in the ultimate goal of establishing an 
independent territory, but their work and efforts are remembered and acknowledged for 
the cultural mark they have left on the African-American coming out of enslavement and 
being subjected to mental and physical genocide. 
On the heels of the emigrationist movement, another nationalist movement was 
being born. In 191 3, Noble Drew Ali founded the Moorish-American Science Temple in 
Newark, New ~ e r s e ~ . l *  Teaching that Islam was the natural religion of black people and 
that the national origin of black people was Morocco, Drew Ali sought to build a 
consciousness among African-Americans that identified them as a separate people, with 
their own history, culture, religion, language, and God distinct from that of traditional 
Christianity and white American society He taught his followers that in order "for a 
people to amount to anything, it is necessary to have a name [nation] and a land."5' Drew 
Ali was so convinced of the need for land and nationality as the basis of progress for 
African-Arneicans that "He believed that before a people can have a God they must have 
a nationality . . . Y ,60 
In attempting to give African-Americans in the U.S. a nationality, Drew Ali is said 
to have visited Morocco and received a commissiorl from the King of Morocco to 
teach Islmi to blacks in America. In his teaching of Islam, Drew Ali asserted that the 
true name of the African in America was Moor or Moorish-American, and that their 
national origin was Morocco. By 1925, Drew Ali had established temples in Pittsburgh, 
Detroit, and Chicago. He took advantage of Booker T. Washington's message of 
economic development as a key to empowerment and established a number of small 
businesses collectively owned by his followers. 
Shortly after Drew Ali founded the Moorish-American Science Temple, Marcus 
Garvey founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in Jamaica in 
19 1 4.61 In 19 17, Garvey moved to Harlem, New York, and established the headquarters 
of the UNIA. Garvey briefly described the mission of the UNIA as one of "uniting all the 
Negro peoples of the world into one great body to establish a country and government 
absolutely their own."62 Establishing the UNIA as the provisional government of the 
international African nation, Garvey was appointed president and quickly made an impact 
upon African-American politics and cultural consciousness. Garvey spoke of both the 
political and economic necessity for Africans to have their own nation, the significance of 
Africans knowing their history and culture, and implementing both into their everyday 
lives. 
Five years after Garvey arrived in the U.S., the UNIA reported a membership of 
several million people in the U.S., Caribbean, South America, and ~ f r i c a . ~ ~  Garvey was 
a "student" of Booker T. Washington's in that he also believed in industrial education, 
acquiring skills, and accumulating wealth as the means of creating progress for African 
people, but Garvey expected these tools of progress to be directed to the elevation of 
Afiica and its people throughout the globe, and not for the purpose of gaining entry into 
the American system. Garvey recognized that African-Americans were, in most cases, 
the most educated and technologically skilled of all Africans and sought to build an army 
of skilled craftsmen, professionals, and leaders who could go to Afiica and use their skills 
to build Africa into an economically and politically powerful nation-states.64 
Garvey and the UNIA established two economic enterprises to support the 
campaign for the redemption of Africa and the nationalist objective of establishing a 
nation ruled by African people. The most successful was the organization's newspaper, 
The Negro World, which Garvey edited. The other venture was the founding of a 
steamship company called the Black Star Line. Many people inaccurately associate the 
Black Star Line with the notion that Garvey intended to transport African-Americans 
back to Africa on a massive scale, but more accurately the Black Star Line was to serve 
the purpose of transporting needed craftsmen and professionals to Africa; it functioned 
more as an importlexport company seeking to establish trade between African countries 
and the ~ i a s ~ o r a . ~ '  
The impact of the UNIA and Garvey on the development of nationalism among 
blacks in the U.S. can be seen in the increased racial consciousness and pride that 
developed during the late 191 0s and eavly 1920s. The Negro World incorporated articles 
discussing politics, economics, culture, and poetry that were all written to inspire blacks 
to take pride in themselves as a people with a long, rich history arid culture, along with 
giving an account of the events and conditions affecting black people and the world from 
a black perspective. The UNIA also established several auxiliary organizations that 
promoted and developed the practice of nationhood. The African Orthodox Church, the 
Universal African Legion, the Universal Black Cross Nurses, the Universal African 
Motor Corps, and the Black Flying Eagles were all established to make nationalism a 
tangible reality in the lives of black people. 
Garvey faced opposition from other black leaders as well as the federal 
government for his plan of African redemption. Dubois criticized Garvey as being 
unrealistic and acting as a demagogue, preying upon the discontent of African-American 
people with American society.66 The two men often criticized and insulted one another 
in an effort to gain prominence as the national leader of blacks in the U.S. Garvey can 
certainly be shown to have had an influence in the long run on Dubois' development as a 
Pan-Africanist, which was developing over time, and after Garvey's imprisonment (1 925) 
and deportation (1 927) by the federal government for mail fraud, a few short years later 
Dubois would speak strongly of the need for unity among Africans across the Diaspora. 
Two years after Garvey was deported, Drew Ali was killed, but his followers 
continued to develop the religious and culturally based nationalism that he founded with 
the Moorish-American Science Temple.. After the death of Drew Ali, leadership of the 
Moorish-American Science Temple was assumed by W.D. ~ a r d , ~ ~  but by 1930 there was 
a split within the organization; two factions developed from the split. One faction 
remained loyal to Drew Ali and would not accept the leadership of W.D. Fard, who 
claimed to be the reincarnation of Drew Ali. The other faction followed the lead of Fard, 
who founded a temple in Detroit in 1 9 3 0 . ~ ~  Fard disappeared in 1933 arid another split 
occurred between those nienibers who believed Fard to be Allah (God) in the flesh, who 
had disappeared to return to the holy city of Mecca, and another faction who only viewed 
him as a prophet. Those who deified Fard eventually moved to Chicago and set up their 
headquarters, with Elijah Muhammad as their recognized leader.69 
There were other nationalist organizations that continued the legacy of Garvey 
during the 1930s. The Peace Movement of Ethiopia was founded in Chicago in ~ 9 3 2 . ~ '  
The organization campaigned for repatriation of African-Americans back to Africa, and 
urged blacks to support a repatriation bill introduced in Congress by Senator Theodore G 
Bilbo of ~ i s s i s s i ~ ~ i . ~ ~  The Ethiopian World Federation Council Inc. founded a branch 
of the organization in Chicago on May 27, 1938, only a year after Dr. Maluku E. Bayen, 
the leader of the organization, had come to the U.S. to request aid from people of 
Ethiopian descent during the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy. The goal of the federation 
was to promote "love and goodwill among Ethiopians at home and abroad, and thereby 
maintain the integrity and sovereignty of ~thio~ia."" 
Oscar C. Brown founded the National Movement for the Establishment of the 
Forty-Ninth State in Chicago during the 1 9 3 0 s . ~ ~  Brown was a lawyer and businessman 
who believed that self-determination for African-Americans could only be achieved 
through the establishment of a separate state for black people. The movement, which was 
mostly political, received very little support as compared to other offshoots of the Garvey 
movement during this time. 
Many of the nationalist organizations founded during the 1930s-1940s did not 
survive. Outside of the Moors, the Garvey movement, and the NOI, most organizations 
were of a local character and sniall in membership. The era of the Great Depression and 
the coming of World War I1 placed nationalism in sort of an incubator period. Although 
there was work being done in the interest of improving and advancing black people as a 
race, the majority of attention was being directed toward gaining access to the 
opportunities presented in the New Deal by President Roosevelt, the opening of skilled 
positions in the war industry to African-Americans during WWII, and the organization of 
African-Americans into unions to increase wages and benefits for black workers. Out of 
this period the NO1 was able to continue its development and modestly increase its 
membership despite the ongoing push by many black leaders and organizations, such as 
A. Phillip Randolph and the Union of Pullman Car Porters, for integration of African- 
Americans into mainstream American society. 
In 1948, Malcolm Little (Malcolm X) made his conversion to Islani while in 
prison, after several letters from his older brother who was a member of the NO1 and 
from Elijah Muhammad himself. In 1952, Malcolm was paroled from Charlestown State 
Prison, and a year later had worked his way up to ". . . assistant minister in Temple 
Number One in Detroit for his excellent work in recruiting new men~bers."'~ Malcolm 
would prove to be the best tool available to Muhammad and the NOI, as he was soon sent 
out from Detroit to organize temples in Boston and Philadelphia. In June 1954, Malcolm 
was appointed head minister of Temple Number Seven in Harlem, New York. Malcolm 
soon joined the many nationalist speakers who occupied the busy comers of Harlem 
recruiting members and espousing doctrines of black unity, self-determination, and 
historical and cultural pride. Between1 954 and 1959, Malcolm addressed blacks 
exclusively, teaching the doctrines of the NO1 and giving a scathing critique of the evils 
of white people and American society, as well as chastising African-Americans for being 
ignorant of their own history and culture and trying to imitate white standards of beauty 
and suc~ess. '~ 
In April 1957, Malcolm became a permanent fixture as an Afiican-American 
leader in Harlem. In response to one of the NO1 members being severely beaten and 
jailed by police, Malcolm ordered members of the NO1 Fruit of Islam (FOI) to assemble 
in front of the police precinct where Hinton Johnson was being held. Over one hundred 
members of the FOI were present and as other local blacks got word of what was taking 
place, the crowd increased to over eight hundred people. In an effort to prevent any 
violence from occurring, the police began to negotiate with Malcolm. After securing a 
promise from the police that Hinton Johnson would receive medical attention and that the 
police officers who beat him would be punished, Malcolm directed the FOI and crowd to 
disperse and within a few seconds the street was clear, to the amazement of the police.76 
After this display of power and leadership, Malcolm became a highly recognized leader 
among the people of Harlem, and other black leaders in New York began to accept his 
invitations to appear with him at Harlem street rallies; Congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell Jr.., Pastor G.C. Taylor of Concord Baptist Church, A. Phillip Randolph, and 
Bayard Rustin were among those who joined Malcolm to discuss the condition of 
African-American people. 77 
Along with the ascension of Malcolm came the birth of the Civil Rights 
Movement (CRM), which, indirectIy, enhanced and promoted the development of 
nationalism among blacks in the U.S. As civil rights leaders and organizations pushed 
for integration and admittance of African-Americans into mainstream American society, 
the violence, denial, and white supremacy doctrines they encountered provided 
nationalists an opportunity to present their agenda of self-determination and 
independence as the solution to the oppressive conditions of the masses of African- 
Americans during the 1950s. The CFW mobilized African-Americans to take action 
politically and economically. The Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 served as the spark 
that moved hundreds of African-Americans in Montgomery to act on their own behalf 
toward achieving their rights as citizens. As the movement moved outside Montgomery, 
blacks across the south began to challenge the system of segregation and face the 
unchecked violence and hostility of southern whites. This led nationalists, particularly 
the NOI, to declare that they P O I )  were the only logical alternative to segregation or 
integration, based on their program of self-determination and independence fiom 
American society. It would be the first time since Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. 
Dubois that the African-American community would be presented with two diverging 
and conflicting political agendas to achieve black liberation. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACT OF MALCOLM X ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK 
NATIONALISM 
As African-Americans entered into the1 960s, nationalists began to criticize civil 
rights leaders and their activities. Malcolm X represented the dissenting voice against the 
politics and tactics of the civil rights leaders, arguing that non-violence and a dependence 
upon white liberal leadership gave power and control of the movement to whites. This 
was problematic because it was the masses of African-Americans who were being 
brutalized for trying to obtain their rights as citizens. Nationalists would challenge the 
doctrine of non-violence as the most effective means of advancing the program of 
obtaining rights for African-Americans. In 1957, Robert Williams would be one of the 
first leaders of the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) to abandon non-violence as a tactical 
strategy to achieve rights for Africans-Americans.' 
Nationalism during the late 1950s and into the 1960s experienced a slow but 
steady growth. Both national and international events occupied the attention and activity 
of the majority of African-Americans. The movement of continental African and Asian 
people toward independence from colonialism after WWII and the igniting of the CRM 
created a highly charged political and social upheaval that spanned two decades. 
Although the CRM took center stage and had the support of the black middle class and 
black southern masses from 1955 through 1966, the nationalist movement continued to 
develop and grow in strength and popularity as many African-Americans began to 
question integration as a viable social response to the violence, poverty, and oppression 
experienced by African-Americans. The nationalist movements of the 1950s and early 
1960s were overshadowed by the struggle for civil rights, but at the same time the 
nationalist movement gained support and acceptance as a viable alternative for African- 
Americans to achieve liberation and independence as a result of the failure of the CRM to 
deliver freedom and liberation. Indeed, by the end of the 1960s, black natiorlalisni had 
replaced the CRM as the main ideology whereby African-Americans hoped to achieve 
liberation, freedom, and independence. 
Organizations such as the Nation of Islam (NOI), the Moorish American Science 
Temple (MAST), and the many offshoots of the Universal Negro Improvement 
Association (UNIA) carried nationalism into the 1960s and continued to grow and 
present their separate nationalist ideologies as they recruited new members, developed 
empowerment programs, built institutions, and educated African-Americans about their 
history, culture, and U.S. social-political and economic oppression of black people. All 
of these organizations were concentrated in the urban centers of the north. Chicago, 
Illinois, Detroit, Michigan, and Harlem, New York were nationalist strongholds that 
provided ample opportunity and resources for recruitment, economic development, and 
ideological support for the nationalist position that a separation of blacks from whites 
was necessary to end the oppression of blacks and redeem the legacy of African- 
American people. The ultimate goal of separation was an independent nation for blacks, 
but during the 1950s and 1960s, nationalist organizations focused on the more 
immediately attainable objectives of cultural, social, and economic empowerment. 
After the deportation and death of Marcus Garvey, the nationalist movement lost 
a great deal of momentum in the United States. As the man who led the largest 
nationalist movement among African people in America, Garvey's persona and 
prominence on the world stage brought cohesion to his supporters and served as a prime 
motivating factor for their allegiance to the UNIA. Although there were very dedicated 
men and women who worked to carry out Garvey's vision after his deportation and death, 
the UNIA as an organization never recovered. Yet the lessons and principles of 
nationalism that Garvey taught and practiced continued to be utilized by nationalist 
leaders and organizations that came after him. These men and women were known as 
Garveyites and held true to the creed that African freedom, liberation, and independence 
were the keys to ending the oppression of black people and returning African people to a 
position of power. 
One of the more successful organizations founded after the collapse of the UNIA 
was the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement (ANPM).~ The group was organized in 
the 1930s and led by Carlos Cooks, a long-time veteran of the UNIA. Cooks had strong 
ties with the UNIA and was reared as a child of the nationalist movement. His father 
had been involved in the UNIA in Bermuda, but had decided to leave the movement; 
however, he encouraged his son Carlos to stay in the UNIA and work with Garvey. 
Carlos Cooks eventually became a lieutenant in the UNIA's Black Legion at the young 
age of 19, and went on to head the Advanced Division of the UNIA in Harlem, becoming 
a very close associate of Garvey. After the deportation of Garvey, Cooks led the Harlem- 
based organization. Under his leadership, the Advanced Division was involved in 
supporting the Liberia Act or "Bilbo Bill" sponsored by Senator Bilbo of Mississippi, 
which supported the establishment of a black state for African-Americans in ~ f r i c a . ~  
Charles E. Smith, a member of the Advanced Division of the IJNIA, went to Washington, 
D.C., to solicit fwids to go around the cowltry and recruit African-Americans for 
resettlement in Africa. 
Carlos Cooks and the ANPM were at the head of the nationalist movement in 
Harlem and began to popularize many of the nationalist ideas that Garvey had preached. 
In fact, many of the well-known phrases of the Black Power Era were actually birthed by 
Garvey. For example, the ANPM organized early "Buy Black" campaigns as part of their 
economic development and empowerment program. They held an annual beauty contest 
called "Ms. Natural Beauty Pageant," which later spawned the slogan, "Black is 
Beautiful" which became popular during the 1960s and 70s. Along with the "Buy Black" 
and natural beauty competition, the ANPM continued the UNIA tradition of African 
pageantry and exhibition with an annual military-style parade down the streets of Harlem. 
They also organized the Unity Convention in 1959, which, among other things, was 
designed to " , . abrogate the word Negro" in reference to African 
Although there was no major nationalist movement with regards to mass 
participation after the deportation and death of Marcus Gamey, black nationalism was 
steadily developing and growing among the grassroots of Harlem, Chicago, and Detroit. 
Carlos Cooks was among the "Street Comer" speakers who filled the streets of Harlem 
on Sunday afternoons "fishing" for new members and appealing to the grassroots 
members of his community. He, along with dozens of others, taught nationalist ideology 
and history, commented on local, national, and international events, and promoted their 
organizations and programs as the best to achieve Afkican freedom and independence.5 
Others in the number were James Lawson, head of the United African Nationalist 
Movement; Mrs. Bessie Phillips (a long-time nationalist from the 1930s), who organized 
the Ethiopia Wisdom House of Judah; Charles Kenyatta, leader of the Mau Mau, a para- 
military group for community protection, whose name was inspired by the freedom 
fighters of Kenya; and Edward "Pork Chop" Davis, who emphasized the need for blacks 
to develop economic power. The variety of spokesmen and women who took to the street 
comers on Sunday afternoons created an atmosphere of radical thinking and action in 
~ a r l e m . ~  
It was this atmosphere that deserves at least a portion of the credit for the early 
nationalist development of Malcolm X as a black nationalist. One could argue that he 
was drawn to the teachings of Elijah Muhammad for his nationalist ideological base 
rather than religious conversion. Elijah Muhammad taught a simple truth that the 
suffering masses of black men and women in the urban north could identify with, which 
was ". . . the Black man must do for self' to overcome the oppression of his enemy 
(white people) and be respected by men of other races.' When Malcolm was introduced 
to Islam, it was wrapped in a distinctly African-American cultural-historical worldview 
that was nationalist. Malcolm did not know anything about Islam, but related 
immediately to the nationalist analysis that Elijah Muhammad and his ministers preached 
in the traditional style of the Black Church. Black nationalism is what Malcolm X taught 
on the streets and in the Harlem Mosque, but he was not alone; the impact of an active 
and very competitive nationalist community influenced Malcolm's development and 
growth substantially. 
In order to appreciate fully the magnitude of Malcolm X on the development of 
modern black nationalism, it is critical to understand that there was a larger nationalist 
community of individuals and organizations that existed in Harlem during the time period 
in which Malcolm X arrived. These organizations and their leaders were, in many 
instances, in competition with one another. This was particularly the case when it came 
to recruitment of members on Sunday afternoons. The NO1 recruited heavily on Sunday, 
after traditional church services ended, and it was common for Malcolm and his "fishing 
team" to promote their program at other nationalist events.' 
These organizations were led by men and women who had been the 
contemporaries and students of Marcus Garvey; they taught that "Africa is the 
motherland", "Jesus is Black", "Buy Black", "Black is Beautiful", and declared that it 
was "nation time" for two to three decades before the phrase would become popular 
among the masses of black people.9 These organizations also worked together (i.e., the 
Unity Conference of 1959) and, due to the level of activity concerning African freedom 
and liberation both internationally and nationally, there was solidarity among those who 
knew that their views were not accepted by mainstream black leaders or the black middle 
class. 
When Malcolm came to Harlem, in 1954, it was a seed bed of nationalist activity 
and organizations that addressed many issues relevant to the condition of blacks in 
Harlem and throughout the United States. Carlos Cooks (who is credited as the man after 
whom Malcolm X patterned his speaking style) and Arthur Reed spoke about the need for 
Africans to become economically empowered and to consider repatriation back to Africa 
in the Garvey tradition. Edward "Pork Chop" Davis was more specific about his 
economic program, which insisted that blacks needed to control 125" Street, a major 
shopping and cultural area in Harlem. Davis was an avid opponent of integration and, 
instead, called for more community unity along with economic empowerment as the 
means whereby to uplift black people. John Henrik Clark and Josef Ben-Jochonnan were 
among the cadre of nationalist spokesmen and theorists. Both men contributed 
substantially to the resurgence of Afiican history and culture among African-Americans 
in Harlem. 
The information and history that was being uncovered and introduced to the 
masses on the streets of Harlem became a major weapon in the arsenal of black 
nationalist appeal and credibility. However, no speaker developed the oratorical skill of 
blending history and politics better than Malcolm X. In many ways, it was Malcolm's 
ability to combine history, politics, and everyday life that made him appealing as a 
speaker. His analysis of the condition of black people and their relationship to whites 
was rooted in a historical and cultural perspective that the majority of African-Americans 
could relate to and agree with." 
Malcolm rose to prominence as minister and then national spokesman for the NO1 
during the mid-1950s. The NOI, prior to the work of Malcolm, was a small religious sect 
with ten temples in the United states.12 After successfully organizing a temple in Boston, 
Massachusetts and in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Malcolni was appointed to the 
prestigious post of Head Minister of Mosque #7 in Harlem in June of 1954.13 When 
Malcolnl took the head position of the Harlem mosque, he entered an active and 
conipetitive nationalist community. Being the leading spokesman for the NO1 in Harlem 
gave Malcolm access to the largest concentration of Mican-Americans in the United 
States coupled with the rigorous and successful program of the NO1 for the upliftment of 
black people, and its location in the media capital of the United States (Manhattan, New 
York), it would not take long for Malcolm to become the most recognized figure of the 
"black Muslims," but also of the nationalist community as well. 
The NOI, commonly known in the 1950s as the "black Muslims," became one of 
the well-known nationalist organizations of the late 1950s and early 1960s as a result of 
the work of Malcolm in establishing temples and initiating training programs. Their 
success at converting incarcerated blacks from a life of crime, drug addiction, and 
feelings of hopelessness and inferiority into responsible, law abiding, determined, and 
proud black people, along with their doctrine of the innate evil of white people and 
divinity of black people, gave the NO1 a status of respect and admiration among the 
masses of African-Americans that was not enjoyed by other nationalist groups.14 During 
street rallies and debates, Malcolm gained attention as the most harsh and truthful critic 
of whites, black bourgeois politicians, and the Civil Rights Movement's philosophy of 
non-violence and integration. 
The famous incident that catapulted Malcolm to a position of consummate 
leadership within the Harlem community was the standoff that took place between the 
NOI's Fruit of Islam (FOI), led by Malcolm, and the New York City police. The 
significance of this event was that it gave the NO1 and Malcolni an opportunity to put 
action behind their words, which was a major criticism of the Muslims as a result of their 
inactivity in the CRM. The NO1 and Malcolm had, up until that time, talked bad about 
white people and the police, but had never confronted them. By acting to directly 
challenge the police on an issue of police brutality, Malcolm became an instant hero, and 
his popularity and leadership placed him in the company of the leading politicians and 
activists of the era. 
There was another incident, or rather an opportunity, that gave Malcolm national 
attention. It was his appearance on the popular news program, "The Mike Wallace 
  how."'^ Malcolm was very impressive during his interview and spoke to Mike Wallace 
in a straight-forward, hold-no-punches style that made him successful as a recruiter and 
speaker on the streets of Harlem. For black people, it was a very significant moment 
because Malcolm had the courage and the intellect to tell whites exactly what he thought 
and felt about them without fear or concern of the consequences. That was not typical of 
how blacks interacted with whites in the 1950s and early 1960s. When Malcolm called 
white people "devils" on national television and criticized them for their unjust treatment 
of blacks, he became a national hero for black people who respected and admired that he 
was bold enough to speak the truth that they themselves were not. Both black and white 
leaders were forced to acknowledge his power and authority as a leader of a nationalist 
organization and popular leader of a grassroots segment of the black community. 
As a minister of the NOI, Malcolm made tremendous contributions to the building 
and organizing of the NO1 into one of the largest and most successful nationalist and 
religious movements in the Afi-ican-American community. Yet his connection to 
Muhammad and the NO1 both strengthened and hindered Malcolm's leadership. The 
NO1 platform gave Malcolm a base from which to impact the lives of thousands of black 
men and women who joined the nationalist organization. At the same time, the religion 
of Islam and the program of the NO1 were peculiar to the masses of African-Americans, 
who were fwndamentally a Christian and westernized people. Malcolm's political and 
historical commentary on current issues was his strongest asset when speaking to the 
black masses, but the internal policies and doctrines of the NO1 did not allow Malcolm to 
exercise his full capability as a major political force, outside of criticizing the CRM and 
its leadership.16 The NO1 was neither on the front lines of the CRM, nor were they active 
in generating any overtly confrontational movement to challenge the existing order of 
society. There were two reasons given by Malcolm for their lack of direct involvement in 
the CRM. The religious reason for their political inactivity was that Allah (God) would 
personally be responsible for the coming judgment and destruction of America, and it 
was the responsibility of black people to separate themselves from America so Allah 
could bring about Armagedd~n.'~ As a nationalist organization, the NO1 did not agree 
with the integrationist goals of the CRM and did not see any benefit in putting their 
organization or any of its members in harm's way to achieve goals they ideologically 
opposed. 
This was the circumstance in which Malcolm found himself during the CRM, 
until his break from the NOI. He was criticizing the CRM, its goals and leadership, but 
offered no other active alternative to those who were not Muslims and were not members 
of the NOI. No matter how much "truth" Malcolm told about the evil of white people 
and the weakness of their African-American co-conspirators, there were Afi-ican- 
Americans being beaten and murdered for their efforts to try and change their condition. 
Malcolm and the NO1 never attempted to act on the behalf of the thousands of African- 
Americans who were involved in the CRM. This was a very difficult position for 
Malcolm to be in as the leading critic against the CRM and national representative of the 
NOI. As stated earlier, Malcolm was more of a nationalist than a Muslim, therefore 
making him more political than religious. This point is made clear when Malcolm states, 
"Any time I have to accept a religion that won't let me fight a battle for my people, I say 
to hell with that re~igion."'~ The CRM was a political movement that had galvanized a 
large segment of the black community into political action. As a nationalist leader, 
Malcolm wanted to direct that political action toward the achievement of nationalist 
goals, mainly land and independence. 
On December 1, 1963, Malcolm made a public comment about the assassination 
of President John F. Kennedy and was punished by Muhammad for violating his orders 
that no minister make any comments concerning the death of the President. Malcolm 
was silenced for a period of ninety days. Malcolm never completed his ninety-day 
suspension from public speaking, but opted instead to leave the NOI.'~ The decision to 
break his ties with the NO1 gave Malcolm greater freedom and ability to become more 
active in influencing the CRM to move in a nationalist direction. The rigid policies and 
philosophical restraints of the NO1 were now removed, and Malcolm began to work 
immediately on developing a nationalist plan to change the CRM from a fight for civil 
rights and integration to a fight for human rights and black liberation. 
Prior to his break with the NOI, Malcolm began to build bridges between himself 
and civil rights leaders. In November 1963, Malcolm attended the northern Grassroots 
Leadership Conference in Detroit. The conference was organized by local civil rights 
leader Reverend Albert B. Cleage, Jr., in conjunction with the Group on Advanced 
leadership (GOAL), along with the newly formed Freedom Now At this 
convention, Malcolm delivered one of his most famous speeches, "Message to the 
Grassroots." Within the speech, Malcolm called for unity among the various civil rights 
leaders and organizations, encouraging them to forget their differences and focus on their 
common condition and common enemy as the basis of their unity. Malcolm used the 
Bandung Conference, held in 1955, among the nations of Africa and Asia (European 
nations were excluded) as an example of the type of unity that would be necessary in 
order for African-Americans to be effective in organizing a successful movement in the 
u.s.~' During his speech, Malcolm continued his critique of the CRM's goal of 
integration and ridiculed African-Americans for referring to the CRM as a revolution 
because history had shown that there is no such thing as a non-violent revolution. 
According to Malcolm, revolution was about gaining control over some land, and, within 
that context, Malcolm began to refer to a black revolution in which African-Americans 
were connected to a worldwide struggle against European oppression. 
Malcolm had been very critical of civil rights leaders during his days in the NOI, 
and now he had to work hard to overcome the bitterness his words had created between 
himself and those leaders, for now he sought to engage them as comrades in the same 
battle. At the time of Malcolm's split with the NOI, many civil rights leaders were in the 
process of re-evaluating their own position concerning integration and non-violence and 
the nationalist alternatives of black independence and the right to self-defense. One of 
the most important events that took place to bring Malcolm and civil rights leaders closer 
to joining ranks was an encounter that the leadership of the Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) had with Malcolm while touring Africa in 1 9 6 4 . ~ ~  
John Lewis and Donald Harris of SNCC met with Malcolm by chance in Kenya 
as the three men were crossing paths on their tow of Africa. Malcolm had already visited 
eleven countries, many of which Lewis and Harris were also planning to visit. During 
their meeting, Malcolm expressed the importance of SNCC being in Africa as a necessary 
step toward gaining the support of African leaders and governments for the "human 
rights struggle" in the U.S. Malcolm informed the two men that African leaders and 
people were in full support of the "Freedom Movement" in the US. ,  " . but they will not 
tolerate factionalism or support particular groups or organizations within the movement 
as a whole."23 Lewis and Harris were very impressed with Malcolni and his ideas and 
soon realized, as they toured other African nations, that Malcolm's ideas had a great 
impact in Africa and on African perceptions of the CRM and its leaders. Malcolm's 
impact was so phenomenal, in fact, that Lewis began to notice that civil rights leaders and 
organizations were evaluated according to 'how much' their ideas and activities were in 
line with ~ a l c o l m ' s . ~ ~  Conversations between the SNCC delegation and African 
statesmen and dignitaries also provided a stimulus of change within the civil rights 
organization, particularly involving the development of relations between Africans in the 
U.S. and Africans on the continent. SNCC irrlmediately established two positions to 
develop correspondence and relations with African nations.25 
Malcolm's ideas and commentary on the CRM and its leaders had a great deal to 
do with the development of nationalism among the masses of Ahcan-Americans and 
civil rights activists as well. Richard and Milton Henry (Imari and Gaide Obadele), two 
Detroit civil rights leaders, met Malcolm on two occasions during which Malcolm 
discussed with them the role of land as the primary goal of a revolution and the basis of 
independence.26 Imari and Gaide Obadele would later abandon the CRM to develop a 
nationalist agenda that eventually culminated in the formation of the Provisional 
Government of the Republic of New Africa. It was Malcolm's analysis of the CRM, his 
nationalist plan, and his appeal to the masses that crowned him as the premiere leader of 
the nationalist movement. The accuracy of his analysis and nationalist agenda would be 
demonstrated by the plethora of nationalist organizations and leaders that implemented 
his ideas and plans, after his death. 
Between the period of Malcolm's initial split with the NO1 and his assassination, 
nationalist ideas and programs were considered more and more as the solution to 
achieving the goals of freedom and liberation among young civil rights workers and 
leaders. The reason for this was Malcolm's new capability to provide analysis and begin 
to develop strategic plans that would solve the problems that civil rights leaders were 
saying integration would solve. As a nationalist, Malcolm supported the development of 
black-owned and controlled institutions and organizations to meet the needs of African- 
American people. To this end, immediately after leaving the NOI, Malcolm founded 
Muslim Mosque Incorporated27 as a means of providing a vehicle for Muslims to become 
directly involved in what was a very powerful and potent political movement with 
nationalist capabilities. As Malcolm began to develop more as a nationalist, he 
recognized the need for a nationalist organization that was open to all African- 
Americans, regardless of religion, and an organization that could serve as a unity council 
for all the various nationalist groups. With this in mind, Malcolm founded the 
Organization of African American Unity (OAAU), modeled after Kwame Nkrumah's 
Organization of African Unity (oAu) .~~  Through the OAAU, Malcolm was able to shift 
the emphasis of the CRM from the goal of integration to a nationalist agenda that called 
for land and independence. Malcolm understood that the success of the nationalist 
movement depended upon the unity of black people and black organizations. His ideas 
on establishing unity within the movement among organizations, as well as continuing to 
provide analysis of the movement's goals and the means to achieve liberation in the U.S., 
firmly placed Malcolm as the undisputed leader of the nationalist community. 
Malcolm's analysis, along with the experiences of the CRM, would eventually 
lead many civil rights activists to take strong nationalist positions after his death. The 
membership of SNCC was noticeably inspired by the ideas of Malcolm. Malcolm's ideas 
concerning the development of an independent political party was put into action with the 
founding of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization in Alabama in 1965 .29 SNCC 
had decided to develop the nationalist goal of an all-black independent political party as a 
means of gaining political power and control of the black belt region of the south. One 
year later, in 1966, SNCC would expel all of its white members and formally adopt the 
nationalist position of gaining independence through political control of the land black 
people occupied in the rural south. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) adopted the 
same position and applied it to the northern urban centers where African-Americans 
represented a large percentage of the population.30 The expulsion of whites from 
membership and leadership positions within both SNCC and CORE represented a 
decisive move to a more nationalist position by both organizations. 
Nationalist ideas were gaining popularity among urban youth and black college 
students in the midst of the height of the CRM, which culminated with the 1963 March 
on Washington. After the passage of the 1964 Voting Rights Act, blacks in the north and 
on the west coast began to realize that their condition of oppression was not going to 
change as a result of new laws. The issues of police brutality, inadequate and unsafe 
housing, inferior education, high unemployment, arid econoniic exploitation remained 
major issues facing African-Americans living in northern and western cities.31 The mood 
among the grassroots segments of the black community was that the civil rights leaders 
and the state and federal governments would not do anything to bring about a positive 
change, and this resulted in an explosion of summer rebellions for a period of seven 
years.32 Beginning with the Harlem riot in July 1964, the 1J.S. would experience massive 
rebellions every summer in its major urban centers through 1970. The most notable 
rebellions were those in Watts in 1965, Cleveland in 1966, and Detroit and Newark in 
1967. Blacks in Detroit and Cleveland were able to combat local police forces 
effectively enough to have the governors of the two states call in the National ~ u a r d . ~ ~  
This, in twn, suggested to revolutionary nationalists that a successfid sustained guerilla 
war was possible against the United States. 
In many instances, the outbreak of the rebellions was attributed to pent-up 
frustrations created by conditions of poverty and "trigger" incidents that served as sparks 
to ignite African-American frustrations into violent revolts against the established 
authority of the police and white-owned businesses operating in black communities. 
Ultimately, the rebellions reflected a conscious effort among African-Americans to be in 
control of their own communities in order to have greater control over their own lives to 
bring an end to their oppression. The revolts were an attack against oppression in the 
black community. Many people anguished over the idea that it was counter productive 
for blacks to burn and destroy their own conlmunities, but blacks who lived in those 
communities understood that, in terms of power and control, the conlmunities were not 
theirs, even though they lived there. The property and majority of businesses and 
houses were owned by whites and Jews, and it was clear that the police were there to 
protect white and Jewish interests and maintain the status quo.34 
The revolts also reflected a clean break from the ideology of the established civil 
rights leadership. In particular, young African-Americans had grown impatient with the 
slow progress, or no progress, of the CRM while continuing to endure the harsh reality of 
poverty and oppression on a daily basis. Commuriity control and aspirations for black 
independence replaced marching, voting, and sit-ins; the possibility-indeed the need- 
for a revolution began to be discussed earnestly among nationalist leaders. Max 
Stanford, leader of the Revolutionary Action Movement, met regularly with Malcolm on 
his visits to ~ a r l e m . ~ ~  Robert Williams, although exiled in Cuba at the time, continued to 
endorse urban guerilla warfare as a means to give African-Americans some bargaining 
power toward their l i be ra t i~n .~~  By 1963, Malcolm began to speak more about revolution 
as he saw it in contrast to what was being called a "Negro Revolution" in the U.S. 
Malcolm argued that a revolution was bloody and meant to upset everything in is path. 
Malcolm also discussed guerilla warfare as a viable means to check the violence of white 
racists, and as a means of neutralizing the police and military power of the state because, 
as was being proven in Vietnam, whites were unsuccessful in guerrilla warfare.37 The 
circumstances of the Watts, Detroit, and Cleveland riots proved Malcolm correct. 
The use of violence as a means and right of self-defense was unacceptable to the 
established civil rights leadership and their white allies. It was foolish and outright 
suicidal, according to civil rights leaders, for African-Americans to consider the 
possibility of using violence to bring an end to their oppression.38 By 1963, African- 
Americans living in urban centers were neither willing to tolerate white racist violence 
nor accept the doctrine of non-violence as the most effective method to combat racist 
violence. Due to the weakening position of integration and non-violence as accepted by 
the masses of African-Americans, civil rights leaders found themselves out of place as 
leaders of the masses of blacks revolting in northern and western cities. From this 
perspective, Malcolm and the nationalists were not able to offer much leadership either, 
due to a lack of organization and resources within the nationalist movement. Malcolm's 
analysis and critique of the CRM and his theory about revolution and guerilla warfare 
served as an ideological foundation, but outside of the Revolutionary Action Movement 
(RAM) group, there was no organizational support offered to lead the revolts and no 
allocation of resources provided to sustain a protracted guerilla war in the urban centers. 
Along with Malcolm's "philosophy," the decline of influence among civil rights 
leaders, and the rebellions of the era, another event took place that solidified and 
vocalized the transformation of the CRM into a nationalist movement. In June 1966, at a 
continuation of the James Meredith March in Mississippi, Willie Ricks, of SNCC, began 
to shout the phrase "Black Power" with his fist being thrust into the air.39 The mood of 
the march was extremely militant to begin with, as a result of it being called to continue 
the march of James Meredith, who had been shot during an earlier march through 
Mississippi. In chanting the slogan, "Black Power," which was taken up by Stokely 
Carmichael (Kwame Toure) in his address to marchers, the tone and intention of the 
activists changed. The slogan "Black Power" was never identified with or limited to one 
specific ideology, but it ultimately shifted the goal of the CRM from integration to a more 
nationalist position of self-determination, independence, and control over the liberation 
movement of black people. Evidence of this shift was distinctly made when SNCC 
decided to form the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCF0)-which became an 
all-black independent political party after SNCC expelled all of its white members one 
year later. A month after the founding of the LCFO, the "Black Power" slogan would be 
heard as a rallying cry in the Chicago and Cleveland rebellions. The masses of black 
people, particularly young African-Americans, wanted to change the condition of black 
people immediately. They were not willing to wait for the fruits of long-term integration, 
and black nationalism became the answer that would eliminate oppression by ultimately 
giving black people an ideological and practical outline of the means to establish a nation 
of their own. The foundation for a nationalist movement had been laid and had all the 
potential to be successful, but there was one very important thing missing-the 
leadership of Malcolm X. 
When Malcolm was killed, the head of the nationalist movement was severed 
from the body. Malcolm was from the tradition of the old vanguard of black nationalists 
who were rooted in the tradition of Marcus Gamey and knew that the success of black 
nationalism was dependent upon the unity of black people. Malcolm was that unifling 
force that the younger generation of black nationalists admired and respected. Malcolm 
was also a statesman who had traveled to Afiica to represent the struggle for black 
liberation and gained support for black liberation among African and Arab leaders. He 
had been able to bridge the gap and dialogue with civil rights leaders, and was a hero to 
the grassroots masses and among black Muslims and Christians in America. He was 
truly a unifying force among the young African-American teenagers and young adults. 
Without his physical presence, there was no general to lead the army and solidify the 
movement. At a time when black people were willing to fight for their freedom and 
independence, the man who inspired them, provided the ideological framework, and the 
one they believed most capable of leading them, was now dead. In a very profound and 
stifling way, the death of Malcolm crippled the nationalist movement irreparably. 
Malcolm X was also a strategist, and, for many black nationalist organizations, 
his words, plans, and actions served as the cornerstone of their missions, goals, and 
objectives. However, without his leadership and unifying presence many aspiring black 
nationalists of the 1960's focused on one dimension of Malcolm's total agenda for black 
liberation, which lead to the factionalism that he warned against. The year 1966, one 
year after Malcolm's death, would prove to be a year of major nationalist growth, 
organizing, arid activism. The birth of SNCC and CORE as all-black organizations, 
along with the formation of the Black Panther Pady for Self-Defense and the emergence 
of the Black Arts Movement propelled black nationalist sentiment and programs to the 
forefront of the black political, economic, and cultural agenda. 
CHAPTER 5 
BLACK NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENT DURING THE BLACK POWER ERA 
SNCC developed the Lowndes County Freedom Organization in Alabama, ran a 
slate of candidates in the 1966 county elections, but failed to win any of the positions as 
county officials. SNCC then changed course and moved its headquarters to Chicago, 
Illinois to expand its program of establishing political control of African-American 
communities by black people. CORE adopted the same approach toward achieving 
economic control of African-American communities, envisioning the creation of a black 
capitalist structure that would lead to economic independence and control of resources in 
the Afirican-American community.' Also during this period, SNCC began to incorporate 
African cultural standards as a means of developing an African value system in the U.S. 
This was part of a cultural renaissance that was taking place among African-Americans to 
develop and institute a new identity and new value system among African-Americans that 
was distinct from Euro-American culture and values. SNCC specifically began to speak 
of the need for blacks to develop religion and customs that reflected their African 
heritage.2 
This was an added dimension to the overall nationalist movement. Before, 
cultural nationalism was linked to the religious nationalism of the NO1 and the Moorish 
American Science Temple. Both groups adopted variations of Islamic culture that was 
identifiable as distinct from traditional western culture practiced by African-Americans. 
The new cultural nationalism focused more on incorporating traditional West African and 
some East African cultural practices, such as, clothing, dance, language, religion, and 
history. SNCC members had moved toward a Pan-African nationalist view and 
spearheaded the injection of cultural nationalism into the main political thrust of 
revolutionary nationalism. Maulana Karenga, founder of the United Slaves (US), was a 
leader along with Amiri Baraka in the development of cultural nationalism as a major 
component to the overall nationalist movement. 
Cultural nationalism is a philosophy of nationalism that advocates African- 
Americans as a distinct cultural group with a distinct system of values, morals, and 
ethics, thereby elevating blacks in the United States to the status of a "Nation within a 
  at ion."^ Cultural nationalists also believed, as a result of African-Americans' 
experience through enslavement and other forms of oppression for over 400 years, that 
African cultural values had been severely compromised and, in some cases, totally 
disregarded by African-Americans who had acculturated to Euro-American values. 
Cultural nationalists therefore believed it would be necessary to establish and institute a 
renewed system of African cultural standards and values among black people if they were 
to develop of a politically sovereign state. Maulana Karenga, based in Los Angeles, 
California, developed an extensive set of theories and practices, known as Kawaita, that 
were meant to aid in the transformation of Africans in the United States from a mostly 
western-white, worldview-centered people to an African, worldview-centered people 
with their liberation and the liberation of all African people as their goal. 
On the east coast, Arniri Baraka, along with Harold Cruse, Larry Neal, Max 
Stanford, and Askia Muhammad Toure, were instrumental in the development of the 
Black Arts Movement (BAM).~ The BAM began with the establishment of the Black 
Arts Repertory Theatre-School in Harlem. The BAM was initiated by Baraka and the 
Theater-School in order to produce plays, teach African history, and introduce 
continental African customs and languages to African-Americans. The movement 
expanded into the political arena when Baraka invited Kwarne Toure to speak at the 
Black Arts Festival in Newark, New Jersey, in 1966. The cultural renaissance spread 
quickly through the BAM and over 800 African-American theatres and cultural centers 
were established In African-American communities throughout the ~ J . s . ~  
The BAM, spearheaded by those promoting the values of Kawaita, sparked the 
Black Power Conferences of 1967- 197 1. In 1967, Baraka and Karenga organized the 
Black Power Conference in Newark, which took place in the aftermath of the rebellion 
that had taken place only a few weeks prior to the conference. The conference brought 
together over 4000 delegates and individuals to discuss the formation, goals, and 
strategies of the Black Power Movement (BPM), which was decisively a nationalist 
movement with regard to its focus on self-determination, unity, cultural identity, and 
political autonomy .6 
The year 1966 also witnessed the emergence of the revolutionary nationalist 
organization, the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP). The BPP clearly defined 
itself as a nationalist organization by its tenth point in the organization's platform: "We 
want land, bread, housing, education . . . And our major political objective, a United 
Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the Black Colony . . . for the purpose 
of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.'" The platform of the 
BPP outlined the organization's goals, but it was their means that gained them notoriety 
as one of the most militant and dangerous of all nationalist organizations, according to J. 
Edgar Hoover and the FBI.' 
? l e  show of force and success the Oakland BPP had in combating police brutality 
and establishing programs to meet the needs of the African-American community gained 
the BPP national exposure, and soon chapters were established in Los Angeles, Houston, 
and Chicago. The east coast Black Panthers, founded by SNCC, consented to the 
consolidation of all Black Panther organizations to form one BPP headed by Huey 
Newton, Bobby Seale, and Eldridge Cleaver.' 
As revolutionary nationalists, BPP members acted as the vanguard soldiers in the 
struggle to defeat racism, capitalism, and imperialism as the basic components of the 
American establishment that held blacks in an oppressed condition. As with most 
nationalist organizations of the period, they adopted socialism as the economic alternative 
to capitalism. Racism would be eliminated as a consequence of an international 
proletarian class struggle of the workers against the capitalist interest of imperialist 
European nations, America being one of them. 
The east coast chapters of the BPP were not as confrontational and opposed to the 
cultural nationalists of the BAM and Maulana Karenga's US. Huey Newton and the west 
coast Panthers viewed cultural nationalism as inconsistent with the mamist interpretation 
of a proletarian class struggle against capitalism and imperialism, in which nationality 
was treated as irrelevant. Newton argued that a return to 1 lth century West African 
traditions and customs was pointless with regard to the state of international affairs and 
revolutionary goals. After being released from prison for the shooting death of an 
Oakland police officer, Huey Newton and the west coast Panthers began to move away 
from the nationalist demand of a U.N. supervised plebiscite toward the ideology of inter- 
communalism, which focused more on the development of coalitions with socialist and 
communist groups to defeat American and European imperialism. In 1969, the east coast 
BPP and the west coast BPP split over ideological and internal friction between the 
leadership.'* 
The east coast BPP maintained its endorsement of cultural nationalist objectives 
as being necessary to the complete liberation of African people. The wearing of African 
garments, speaking Swahili and Yoruba, adoption of African names, and forming 
alliances with continental Africans remained a part of their nationalist programs. They 
simultaneously prepared for and advocated the use of guerilla warfare against American 
police and military forces. 
In the midst of the height of the BPP's popularity and growth in the movement, 
another revolutionary nationalist organization was being formed. After the Detroit 
rebellion in 1967, the leadership of the civil rights organization Group on Advanced 
Leadership (GOAL) decided to dissolve the organization and some of its members, 
including Imari and Gaidi Obadele formed the Malcolm X Society, which hosted the 
Black Government Conference of 1968 to pursue the development of a national body." 
The national body would serve to organize African-American people and all nationalist 
organizations into a provisional government, for the purpose of establishing an 
independent and sovereign nation for African-Americans in the U.S. As a national body, 
nationalists of every ideological persuasion were represented. Cultural and revolutionary 
nationalism were integrated to represent the internal and external means that would lead 
to complete liberation of African-American people, while maintaining a commitment to 
the larger international issue of a Third World revolution against imperialism and 
colonialism. The national body came to be known as the Provisional Government - 
Republic of New Africa (PGRNA). 
The ideology of the PGRNA was revolutionary in that it sought to wage an armed 
struggle against U.S. police and military forces as a necessary means to achieve the 
liberation of black people. Additionally, it articulated the necessity of land upon which a 
nation could be built.12 Unlike the BPP, the land issue was central to the nationalist 
ideology of the PGRNA. Based on Malcolm's philosophy that ". . . land is the basis of 
independence . . .," the revolution must, then, include the control of land. The founding 
of the PGRNA represented the fullest expression of the continuation of a nationalist 
tradition that has roots as far back as the maroon communities. By maintaining a 
commitment to culture and revolution as the means to effect African-American liberation, 
the PGRNA set out a plan not only to establish a separate and sovereign nation for black 
people, but also to guarantee its "Afiicaness" by developing a cultural and economic 
system of values that would transform African-Americans into a New African people. 
On April 4, 1968 a few days after the RNA was founded, Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee. Although Dr. King was not a nationalist 
and, in fact, represented the ideology of integration and assimilation, his death destroyed 
the last hope that many Afiican-Americans had for achieving the goals of the CRM. 
Riots continued to break out all over the country, and the objectives and goals of a 
nationalist agenda became the main political thrust for many African-Americans. The 
RNA set out to build the nation that nationalist supporters and leaders had been speaking 
of for years. Indeed, thirteen years of fighting for civil rights and seeing very little 
progress had only fueled what Malcolm had been saying all along - --- "It's Nation time." 
The RNA began the work of transforming this mere slogan into practice. 
To turn this slogan into a reality, on March 29-3 1, 1968, over 500 nationalists 
from around the country, representing various organizations and themselves individually, 
gathered at New Bethel Baptist Church in Detroit, Michigan, to decide on the issue of 
independence for African-Americans in the United States. l 3  On March 3 1, 1968, the 
delegates elected three officers to a provisional government, named the new nation, 
created laws, determined the national territory and declared the nation independent 
(although subjugated and in need of liberation from U.S. authority and jurisdiction). 
Of the five hundred delegates at the convention, one hundred signed the declaration of 
independence. 
The history of the Provisional Government-Republic New Africa serves as the 
culmination of nationalist desires to put into practice the rhetoric that had been spoken by 
its leaders and supporters for several years. As a guideline to follow in their quest to 
found an independent nation the PGRNA used a booklet written by Imari Obadele titled, 
War irz America- The Malcolm XDoctrine In the booklet, Obadele outlines the 
theorectical-legal right that African-Americans have to found their own nation. The 
position taken by the PGRNA was that it was not only the desire of African-Americans to 
have their own nation, but it was a right that had been denied them since the end of the 
Civil War. According to the argument put forth by Obadele, African-Americans were 
never given an opportunity after their emancipation from enslavement to make an 
informed decision concerning their national status.14 As a distinct ethnic and cultural 
group which had been released from bondage, African-Americans, based upon 
international law, should have had the right to: 1) decide whether they wanted to form 
their own nation on American soil; 2) return to Africa at the expense of the United States 
government; 3) be transported to another nation that was agreeable to their immigration; 
or 4) become United States citizens. Because the United States government had denied 
Afiican-Americans the right to make an informed decision with regards to their national 
destiny, African-Americans were not legal citizens of the U.S. and still had the right to 
determine their national destiny by holding a plebiscite vote. 
In determining the location of the new black nation the PGRNA chose the five 
southern states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Their 
selection was also based upon a standard set by international law. According to 
international law, if a people have lived traditionally on an area land, if they have worked 
and developed it, and if they have fought to defend it and stay upon it, that land is 
theirs. l 5  Historically, African-Americans had met all of the above criteria for claiming 
those particular five southern territories. 
The PGRNA laid out a well organized blueprint of how the new government was 
to function in order to acconlplish its goal of bringing to fruition an independent black 
nation-state. The three offices of President, Vice-President, and Minister of Information 
were elected at the founding convention, with Robert Williams serving as President in 
Exile, Gaidi Obadele as Vice-President, and Imari Obadele as Minister of Information. 
Several cabinet-positions were created and were assigned at a later date. Among those 
positions were Ministers of Culture, Education, Finance and Treasury, Defense, State and 
Foreign Affairs, Interior, Health and Welfare, Justice, and Economic Development. 
Along with these positions, territories where the PGRNA was active were given the title 
of Consulates or Government Centers. Consulates were defined as territories that existed 
outside the national territory and were located in cities throughout the country (i.e., New 
York, Washington D.C., Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Baltimore) and Government Centers were territories located within the 
national territory (i.e., New Orleans, Jackson). 
After the government structure had been established the PGRNA went about the 
work of putting its program into action. The basic plan was twofold. The first thing the 
PGRNA set out to accomplish was to inform African-Americans that they were a nation 
in fact and had their own government. The PGRNA took on the responsibility of 
educating Afiican-Americans throughout the country and preparing for an internationally 
supervised plebiscite vote to determine the will of Afi-ican-Aniericans with regard to their 
national destiny. The PGRNA believed that African-Americans would overwhelmingly 
support the PGRNA as their government of choice versus remaining under the 
government of the U.S. based upon historical and then present conditions of oppression. 
The second thing to be done was to prepare to liberate the national territory itself. 
The strategy for liberating the national territory was also outlined in Imari Obadele's War 
in America the Malcolm XDoctrine. Imari outlines a process made up of eight 
components. The first component is a holding action in the north. Through the use of 
underground urban guerillas a situation would be created in which the United States 
would be forced to call on its military forces to police urban centers. At the same time, 
African- Americans sympathetic to the cause of the PGRNA would be supporting the 
PGRNA with money, information, political pressure, and people. 
While urban guerillas in the north are forcing the United States to use its military 
personnel to police the cities, the PGRNA would be carrying out a major drive to win 
African-American control of Mississippi. This would involve a campaign to win the 
consent of AfYican-Americans in Mississippi to acknowledge the PGRNA as their chosen 
government and take their consent fro111 the United States government. The focus would 
be on Mississippi first, but similar campaigns would be carried out in South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana. 
Also in the south, the PGRNA would be prepared to wage "A vigorous military 
campaign based on defense of property purchased by the PGRNA and defense of land 
over which the RNA claims sovereignty by reason of black people: a) having lived 
traditionally on the land and worked it; b) having fought for the land and clung to it; and 
c) having taken their consent from the United States and given it to the Republic of New 
~ f r i c a . " ' ~  The fourth aspect of the strategy involved gaining the recognition of the 
independence and sovereignty of the Republic of New Africa by the United Nations 
(UN). The PGRNA would also pursue the right of African-Americans to reparations, 
including money, machinery, factories, laboratories, and land. Coinciding with the 
recognition of the RNA by the UN is the cultivation of support and the building of 
alliances with the nations of Afiica, Asia, the Caribbean, and South America. The 
PGRNA was particularly interested in forming an alliance with China due to their armed- 
nuclear capabilities, as a preventative against U.S. attacks on the RNA. 
Once the first five objectives had been achieved, the PGRNA would set about the 
busiriess of governing the nation in fact, as opposed to provisionally. The first step 
would have been to institute state power to improve education, end discrimination and 
unemployment, and begin to operate industries that would meet the needs of the people 
and the nation as a whole. The next step would be to create economic unions and a 
common market between the RNA, Caribbean nations, Africa, Asia, and South America. 
The creation of an economic union with other friendly nations would then take on the 
development of economic-political alliances that would form a federation linking the 
RNA with the black-controlled nations of the Caribbean. This eight step outline served 
as the guide for the pursuit of independent statehood for the PGRNA and gave purpose to 
its governmental structure. Shortly after the founding of the PGRNA the plan was put 
into action. The events that unfolded after the founding of the PGRNA did indeed test 
the theory, philosophy, and ideology of this ambitious enterprise into independent 
statehood for African-Americans. 
As one may suspect, during the first three to four years of the existence of the 
RNA there was a great deal of conflict and controversy surrounding the young 
government. To finalize their government structure Imari and Gaidi Obadele met with 
Robert Williams in Dar ES-Salaam, Tanzania in June 1968, to c o n f m  his acceptance of 
the position as President. Williams accepted the presidency at a press conference held in 
a Tanzanian hotel. Just as significant as the meeting with Williams, there was an 
informal meeting that took place between the three RNA officials and several foreign 
dignitaries. Among those at the meeting were Tanzanian Minister Mohamrnad Babu and 
other Tanzanian officials, members of various African liberation fronts, the Sudanese 
Ambassador, a Chinese attache, and the U.S.S.R. First secretary.17 This was a huge step 
for the RNA in developing its diplomatic and foreign relations. 
However, the tenure of Williams as president was short lived. In October of 1969 
the PGRNA had worked to return Williams to the U.S. so that he could begin working as 
an active president. Williams, however, spent the majority of his time and energy 
fighting extradition back to North Carolina to face charges for the 1959 kidnapping he 
had been accused of, which resulted in his self-imposed exile. Williams resigned as 
president of the RNA by December of the same year.18 Very little changed with the 
resignation of Williams, except that Gaidi Obadele became the president and Imari 
Obadele became vice-president. 
In its attempt to gain recognition as a legitimate government the PGRNA 
submitted a letter to the U.S. State Department on May 24, 1968, advising the Johnson 
administration of the existence of the RNA and requesting a meeting with U.S. 
government officials to discuss reparations in the form of land and money. The U.S. 
government never made a formal reply. Along those same lines in May of 1969, Gaidi 
Obadele, Imari Obadele, and Adekoya Akinwole (a.k.a. Herman Ferguson), held a 
meeting with U.S. Congress Representatives John Conyers, Shirley Chisolm, Augustus 
Hawkins, Robert Nix, and a representative from Adam Clayton Powell's office to request 
negotiations with the U.S. government for reparations.19 The result of that meeting led to 
John Conyers serving as a liaison for the RNA to the U.S. government. Conyers was the 
state representative from the Detroit area and had defeated Gaidi Obadele in the 1964 
election for state representative,20 Conyers' familiarity with Gaidi and the RNA provided 
the RNA with some ability to have their demands heard by U S. government officials. In 
1971, Conyers submitted a request to the U.S. Attorney General for a meeting with the 
RNA, but never received a response. No U.S. president ever made a formal reply to any 
RNA request for negotiations. 
During the same year, on March 29, 1969, the RNA held its first annual 
convention at New Bethel Baptist Church in Detroit, Michigan. As the convention was 
coming to a close, a shootout took place between the Black Legionnaires (the security 
and para-military force of the RNA) and officers of the Detroit Police Department. 
During the confrontation, one police officer was killed and another wounded. None of 
the participants at the convention were killed, but four persons were injured.?' 
According to the newspaper reports, the two officers, Michael Czapski and 
Richard Worobec, were on a routine patrol of the area when they noticed several men 
carrying rifles. As the officers pulled up to the men (Black Legionnaires) to investigate 
the open carrying of weapons, a shootout began. Officer Worobec stated that he and 
Officer Czapski were fired upon first by the Black Legionnaires, but this was not 
confirmed based on the evidence, which included a police recording of the entire incident 
beginning with the initial observation by the officers of several black men carrying open 
arms. 22 
After the killing and wounding of Officers Czapski and Worobec, respectively, 
Officer Worobec called in for backup. As other Detroit policemen entered onto the 
scene, they began to fire a total of 84 rounds into the church. Those attending the 
convention were able to protect themselves by hiding underneath the pews. After the 
police stopped shooting, they raided the church and arrested everyone present, a total of 
147 people.23 
Gaidi Obadele had left the convention before the shootout occurred, but upon 
hearing about it and the subsequent arrest of those attending the convention, he contacted 
State Representative James Del Rio. Representative DeI Rio contacted Reverend 
Franklin and the two men notified Judge George Crockett that the police had raided New 
Bethel Baptist Church and arrested 147 people after a shootout between police and 
PGRNA Black ~ e ~ i o n n a i r e s . ~ ~  Judge Crockett acted immediately, and what he was able 
to accomplish was unprecedented. 
Upon arriving at the police precinct, Judge Crockett set up an impromptu 
courtroom. He found the police in violation of the constitutional rights of the men and 
women they arrested. The police had not so much as even created a list of the persons 
they had arrested, no one had been formally charged with any crime, they were 
questioning the people and performing nitrate tests without giving anyone their right to 
have legal counsel present during questioning or testing procedures. The police had also 
been holding the people for more than seven hours without formally processing them, 
which was a violation of their constitutional rights. In accordance with the law and his 
judicial powers, Judge Crockett released all but two of the persons arrested, which the 
police had formally charged.25 
Judge Crockett received a great deal of criticism fiom the Detroit Police 
Department and several public officials for his actions, but there was nothing anyone 
could do about it. He was within his full authority to protect the constitutional rights of 
the persons being held illegally by the police. Judge Crockett had ordered the police 
either to charge the people with a crime or release them. The police were only able to 
justifL charging two men, and Judge Crockett subsequently released 145 people. The two 
men charged with the shooting death and wounding of Officers Czapski and Worobec 
went to trial and were acquitted.26 
The significance of the New Bethel Baptist Church incident in the development of 
the RNA is very important. The support that the RNA and its citizens received from 
black city and state government officials revealed a network of resources that could be 
called upon to support the new government. It also displayed the level of consensus 
among many African-Americans that the nationalist objectives of self-determination land, 
and independence were not only grassroots based, but the black middle class and 
professionals also supported these same ideals to some degree, if not by words, at least in 
action. 
In November of 1969, a rift developed within the leadership of the RNA. There 
was some disagreement concerning the political and military development of the young 
government. Imari was pushing for the RNA to take decisive action toward moving the 
government and its operations into the national territory, the south. Imari also wanted to 
build the Black Legionnaires into a 100,000 defensive force.27 These two points were not 
agreeable to Gaidi and several other cabinet members, who held the opinion that the 
RNA should continue to h c t i o n  primarily in the north. Gaidi did not support the 
building of a large military force because he believed it would draw too much attention to 
the RNA as a violent threat to the U.S. and give the U.S. government a reason to attack 
the RNA before the young government was capable of responding and defeating such an 
attack. Gaidi and other cabinet members were also opposed to moving the headquarters 
of the RNA to Mississippi, arguing that it was premature and that there was not enough 
support in the south for the RNA to be effective in meeting its goals and overall 
~bjective.~' 
Gaidi's position had a great deal of merit. The RNA had not been in existence for 
very long and they needed to build a firm foundation of financial and political support 
and achieve recognition as a government prior to moving into the south. The political 
and financial base of the RNA was in Detroit and other northern and western urban 
centers (i.e., New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, D.C., Los Angeles, 
and San Francisco). There was no base support established in the south and black 
nationalism had not become a household word among black southerners as it had among 
blacks in the north. Gaidi was interested in continuing to build on the established 
northern support for black nationalism, which would eventually lead to a move into the 
south at a later date. Based on the events and outcome of the "shootout" with the Detroit 
police, there was strong evidence to support Gaidi's position. The RNA had support in 
Detroit from influential black politicians, a powerful judge, well known ministers, and 
local citizens. Simply put, the RNA was strongly supported in Detroit. The financial 
support that the RNA could count on to buy bonds and land certificates would come fi-om 
other black nationalists who were primarily based in the north, as opposed to the south 
where a strong nationalist movement had yet to be developed. The urban north and west 
was the hot bed of Afiican-American discontent as displayed by the number of riots that 
took place in many of the cities where the RNA established consulates (i.e., New York, 
Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, D.C., and Philadelphia). It was 
fioni the urban north and west that the RNA found the majority of its citizens and 
supporters; it was logical, then, that the majority of the financial and political support 
would come fi-om these same areas. 
Imari and those who supported moving south argued that the government needed 
to function within the national territory. There was a lot of work to be done to win the 
consent of blacks in the south to acknowledge the RNA as their government of choice. 
The RNA had specifically identified the five southern states of South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana as the home of the new black nation, although it 
was subjugated territory. The primary work to be done concerning winning the consent 
of the people was in the south. Preparing to hold a plebiscite, educating people about the 
RNA, and gaining their support could not be done effectively from Detroit, New York, or 
Los Angeles. The work had to be done in the national territory in order for the RNA to 
build a base of support in the south to fulfill its basic objective of building an independent 
nation in the south. It was a basic assumption of the RNA that the majority of black 
people, particularly in the south, would choose to support their own government versus 
continuing to live under the oppressive conditions imposed upon them by the U.S. at all 
levels of government. That assumption needed to be tested and worked out by practical 
and tangible means. Iniari was pushing for the RNA to become a government in fact, 
which meant governorship over a territory for black people. He and his supporters 
believed that they were ready to take a more direct approach to make the RNA a 
functional reality. 
The disagreement resulted in Gaidi suspending Imari from his post as Regional 
Vice President and Minister of the Although the seriousness of the 
disagreement was played down by Imari in the local newspaper in which he stated, "It 
happens in governments all the time . . . It's a normal procedure. Cabinet members have 
been suspended before but just because Gaidi is my brother it has been made to appear 
there is a rift between The "rift" led to the RNA forming a Constitutional 
Committee which held an emergency election in January 1970 to elect a new president 
and cabinet. Imari Obadele won the election. 
The rest of 1970 was spent laying the initial groundwork to begin organizing and 
developing the infi-astructure to begin government work. In April, the newly elected 
RNA officials met at Cornell University to officially inaugurate Imari Obadele and his 
cabinet members. In May, Imari moved the government operations to New Orleans and 
by August, the headquarters was moved to Jackson, Mississippi. The move into 
Mississippi was accompanied by a national convention and press conference in which 
Imari announced, "that [the] RNA is organizing [a] peaceful plebiscite and desires 
Jackson and U.S. officials to cooperate and participate."31 At the time, there was no 
response given by the U.S. government or the state of Mississippi concerning the 
announcement or move of the RNA into Mississippi. The RNA purchased homes, set up 
an office, and began the work of informing the black people of Jackson about the RNA 
and its program to establish an independent black nation. 
One of the first major projects that the RNA worked on was the purchase of 
twenty acres of land from a local black farmer named Lofton Mason, in January 1971. 
The land was located in Hinds County about 30 miles outside of ~ a c k s o n . ~ ~  The land was 
earmarked for the development of the first new community proposed by the RNA, which 
was projected to support 500 families on the land site by September of that year. By 
May, Mr. Mason had changed his mind about selling the land to the RNA. According to 
the Michigan Chronicle, Mr. Mason said, ". . . RNA officials agreed to pay him $25,000 
for the 20 acre area near Brownsville, then failed to come up with the money. He also 
charged that RNA members illegally re-entered his property last Thursday night armed 
with guns after he had posted 'no trespassing' signs and padlocked a gate leading to the 
land."33 Imari responded to Mr. Mason's statements in the New York Times claiming, 
". . . that Mason was pressured into backing down on the sale by white men who said 
they were FBI agents . . . They told Mason they would burn his house, kill his cattle and 
poison his water if he went through with the sale to Imari's statements would later 
be proven to be correct via the FBI's own documentation of their activities to disrupt any 
attempt by the RNA to secure land in ~ i s s i s s i ~ ~ i . ~ '  The deal with Mr. Mason was only 
one of several attempts by the RNA to obtain land in the black belt. 
Concerning the Mason land dispute, warrants were issued by Mississippi Attorney 
General P.F. Sumner for the arrest of RNA citizens after Mason filed trespassing charges 
against the RNA. Sumner, along with more than a dozen sheriffs, attempted to make the 
arrests on the property; however, when they arrived, they found that it had been 
abandoned. Before leaving, Sumner posted a court order, ". . . forbidding the RNA to 
operate in the state or 'engage' in any activities that would threaten a breach of the 
peace.'' Sumner called the RNA "dangerous" and a "threat to peace in Mississippi" and 
stated that the RNA ". . . will be out of the state in a few days or they will be in 
Later that month, Inlari was served a Mississippi Court injunction by District Attorney 
Jack Travis concerning the land dispute which forbade the RNA from entering onto the 
land. 
The RNA did not file counter charges against Mr. Mason with the local court, but 
instead convened their own legislative body, called the People's Center Council, to 
resolve the dispute. In July, The People's Center Council organized a People's Court in 
Hinds County to review the transaction between Mr. Mason and the RNA. The People's 
Court ". . . found that Mason and the F.B.I. were the real swindlers and that they 
attempted to cheat not only the Provisional Government, but all black people."37 The 
RNA used the land dispute with Mr. Mason as a practical teaching tool to educate the 
local black community concerning their right to independence and identifjkg the 
Jackson-Delta area of Mississippi as a zone of disputed sovereignty that required a UN- 
supervised plebiscite. 
After being served the injunction by the District Attorney, Imari wrote a letter 
requesting to meet with Attorney General Sumner to negotiate the terms and conditions 
of the RNA. Surnner replied indirectly to Imari's request via a local newspaper, by 
stating that he had no authority to negotiate with the RNA and referred the matter to the 
U.S. State Department. Surnner stated in a letter written to the U.S. Attorney General 
that he viewed the RNA's presence in Mississippi as an "invasion" and an "armed 
ins~rrection."~~ Imari tried to assure Jack Travis and Sumner that the RNA's work in 
Mississippi was peaceful and legal, emphasizing that the goals of the RNA were to 
organize a supervised plebiscite that would allow black people in Mississippi to choose 
their national destiny and to hold a reparations election. Although the RNA tried to 
pursue their objectives in a non-confrontational manner, it would become obvious that 
the state of Mississippi and the federal government viewed the RNA as a threat, both 
politically and militarily. 
The RNA continued to make advances in establishing themselves as a 
government entity in the state of Mississippi. In June, a permanent headquarters and 
presidential residence was established at 1148 Lewis Street in Jackson. Three Jackson 
neighborhoods had been organized and "reparations captains" had been elected.39 The 
RNA held marriage ceremonies for its citizens, taxes were being collected, and there was 
a strong sense of support from the local black community. Things did not continue to go 
smoothly much longer. In August 1971, the RNA was involved in a full-blown attack by 
the state of Mississippi and the FBI.. The outcome of the attack was devastating to the 
RNA's ability to move forward, but also showed the strength and commitment that the 
RNA had to overcome extreme challenges and remain focused on the ultimate goal of 
independence. 
On August 18, 1971, at approximately 6:30 a.m., the Jackson Police Department 
and the FBI arrived in riot gear and a tank in front of RNA headquarters at 1148 Lewis 
St. to serve three arrest warrants on RNA citizens." Using a bullhorn, the police made 
the announcement for everyone in the house to come out. There were seven RNA 
citizens asleep in the house. The police and FBI waited severity-five seconds, and when 
no one exited the house, the police began to fire tear gas into the house. The citizens 
inside the house then began to shoot at the police and FBI. A shootout ensued that lasted 
for twenty minutes. At the end of the shooting, Addis Ababa ". . . squat walks out under 
the three foot elevation . . . calling Hold your fire! Hold your fire! We're coming 
and then all seven RNA citizens exited from underneath the side of the house. One 
police officer (Lt. Skinner) was killed from a gun shot to the head and one police officer 
was injured, along with a FBI agent. The seven RNA citizens were immediately placed 
under arrest. The police and FBI had also arrested four more RNA citizens at another 
residence a few blocks away at 1320 Lynch Street; among them was Imari Obadele, but 
no shootout took 
The police had arrested 1 1 RNA citizens who soon became known as the RNA- 
11. Their names and ages were: Iniari Obadele, 41 ; Hekima Ana (a.k.a. Thomas 
Norman), 26; Aisha Salim (a.k.a. Brenda Blount), 25; Offagga Quadduss (a.k.a. Wayne 
James), 23; Addis Ababa (a.k.a. Denis Shillingford), 20; Chumaimari Fela Askadi (a.k.a. 
Robert Stalling), 19; Karim Hekima Omar Wadu Njabahdi (a.k.a. Larry Jackson), 15; 
Tamu Sana (a.k.a. Anne Lockhart), 24; Spade de Mau Mau (a.k.a. S.W. Alexander), 22; 
Tawwab Nkrumah (a.k.a. George L. Mathews), 27; and Njeri Quadduss (a.k.a. Toni 
Renee Austin), 21 .43 All eleven citizens were charged with murder and treason against 
the state of Mississippi with a $25,000 bond for each person, even though four of those 
arrested were not present at the house where the shootout took place. 
The RNA believed that the attack was a conspiracy to assassinate Imari Obadele, 
along with the other citizens of the RNA. The police and FBI acted under the guise of 
attempting to serve four arrest warrants, but no warrants were served before or after the 
shootout. Only one of the individuals who the police had a warrant for was present at 
either location. The police had served a warrant eleven days prior to the attack on 
August 7, which was accepted by Imari without any violence. The officer who served the 
warrant was never consulted by Lt. Skinner or FBI agent Lindberg, the two nien who 
planned the attack on the RNA the night before on August 17. The overall procedure for 
serving the warrants was out of the ordinary, according to the testimony of two Jackson 
police officers with five and seven years experience, who had served warrants 
previously.44 A combined total of 35 police and FBI agents were involved in the process 
of serving four arrest warrants at 6:30 a.m. According to an RNA document, "The 
Jackson Police and FBI came prepared for attack .. .. . They brought bullet proof vests, 
helmets, riot guns, gas masks, and service revolvers . . . They even brought an armored 
tank.. ."45 A key witness to the event was Ms. Christina Lundberg, a white school teacher 
who lived near the house where the shootout took place. Ms. Lundberg recorded the 
attack after being awakened by gunfire and testified that she thought the police were 
doing something wrong and had been intimidating individuals. When asked how by the 
prosecuting attorney she replied, "By a massive show of 
It was clear to the RNA that the police and FBI did not come to serve warrants, 
but to carry out a violent attack against the RNA that was intended to kill Imari and those 
at the 1148 Lewis Street address. According to RNA documents, "The FBI fired gas 
rockets into the two back bedrooms in the opening salvo of their [raid], and investigators 
later testified that the most bullet holes were found in the bedroom normally occupied by 
President ~ b a d e l e . ~ ~  However, the bedroom had been occupied that night by the visiting 
RNA Midwest Vice President, Hekima Ana, and his wife Tamu. 
The RNA had made preparations for just such an attack.. They had dug a tunnel 
under the floor of the house that the citizens hid in during the shootout.. This was 
significant because by 197 1, black nationalists had witnessed several police attacks 
against the Black Panther Party, the most deadly being that against the Chicago-based 
BPP, in which Fred Hampton was brutally shot to death in 1969." The tunnel was 
created to provide protection and allow for RNA citizens to act offensively by firing back 
from a secure position. When the police served Imari the first warrant on August 7, New 
African guards took it as a sign of a prelude to an attack, due to Jackson police and plain 
clothes whites keeping the house on Lewis Street surrounded for thirteen hours prior to 
serving the warrant. There was no evidence that the RNA planned to attack the Jackson 
Police, FBI, or any other government agency. After the arrest of the seven citizens at the 
shootout, the only weapon found in the house was a .35 caliber rifle that was later 
identified as the one fired by Hekima Ana that killed Officer Skinner and wounded the 
other police officer and FBI agent.49 
Initially, all eleven citizens of the RNA were taken to the Hinds County Jail in 
Jackson Mississippi, and charged with murder and treason against the state of 
Mississippi. In September, the RNA-11 were illegally transferred from the Hinds County 
jail to the State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi. RNA attorneys were able to have 
the RNA-11 returned back to the Hinds County jail after filing a Habeas Corpus 
motion.50 The charges were later changed by the state to murder, waging war against the 
state of Mississippi, assault and battery, and receiving stolen property.51 In November, 
Mississippi and the federal government issued formal indictments against the RNA-11. 
Iniari, Hekima, Offaga, Addis, Chwnaimari, Karim, Tamu, and Njeri were all charged 
with conspiracy to assault a federal officer, assault, and conspiracy to possess a machine 
gun. 52 
The seven RNA citizens who were not released on bond remained in the Hinds 
County jail before going to trial. Hekima Ana was the first to go to trial in May 1 9 7 2 . ~ ~  
He pleaded not guilty and testified that he and his wife Tamu Ana were awakened by 
another RNA citizen before the shooting began, and they feared for their lives and fired 
in self-defense. The state prosecution presented evidence that Hekima's palm print was 
found on the .35 caliber rifle that was used in the killing of Lt. Skinner. The jury found 
Hekima guilty on all charges, but did not agree on the death penalty, which by default 
mandated a life sentence.j4 Offagga Quadduss and Karim Njabafudi also received life 
sentences by the state of Mississippi, and Addis Ababa was sentenced to two concurrent 
ten-year prison terms. They served their time at the Parchman State Penitentiary. Iniari 
remained at the Hinds County Jail on bonds totaling $75,000 until April 1973, when he 
was released by the state on personal bond. One month later, he was ordered to stand 
trial on federal charges of conspiracy to assault federal officers, assault, and conspiracy to 
possess a machine gun. 
After the initial arrest of the RNA-11, there were several other RNA citizens who 
were arrested and harassed by the police throughout the country. Following the arrest of 
the RNA-11, ten other RNA citizens were arrested within a two-week period after the 
shootout. The charges involved traffic violations, disorderly conduct, talking back to a 
police officer, possession of marijuana, and possession of a concealed weapon. One of 
the citizens arrested was RNA attorney William Miller who was released immediately 
after his arrest, but the other citizens were convicted on misdemeanor charges and spent 
between one and four months in jail. In September 1971, Imari Obadele 11, Rayford 
Johnson, and Cicero Love (all RNA citizens) were arrested in Detroit for the murder of a 
black police officer. The three men were found guilty on murder charges, but the guilty 
verdict was thrown out by Judge George Crockett based on insufficient evidence. RNA 
citizens Kimani Kali, Kojo Kambui, and Gamba Kambui of Michigan were arrested and 
found guilty of kidnapping around the same time. In November 1971, RNA citizens Fela 
Oluntunji, Macheo Sundiata, and Antar Rah were placed under arrest by police in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. All three men escaped and hijacked a plane to Cuba. In 
January 1972, Kwablah Mthawabu, who was serving as Special Minister to the IJnited 
Nations, was convicted of conspiring to rob a white man and sentenced to 50 years. In 
November of the same year, the FBI charged Kamau Kambui with ". . . signing his name 
incorrectly while purchasing a shotgun," and he was sentenced to five years at a federal 
prison in Milan, Michigan.. Prior to his arrest, Kamau was continuing the organizing 
efforts of the RNA in the Kush district of Mississippi (i.e., Jackson and the Mississippi 
delta region).s5 What appeared to be a general harassment and attack on RNA citizens, 
soon became known as the FBI's COINTELPRO program, which was designed not only 
to eliminate the RNA, but to destroy the black nationalist movement as a whole. 
A survey of the history of black nationalism has revealed a very diverse and 
heterogeneous make-up of the various leaders, organizations, and movements that have 
taken up the charge of liberating African-Americans from white oppression and to 
solidify that liberation in the form of a land based territory. Without a doubt there has 
always been resistance to black nationalist aspirations for independence by the United 
States government and its state and local authorities, however, the history has also shown 
that the failure of black nationalists to found an independent black nation-state has more 
to do with the internal weaknesses and struggles of black nationalists than external 
resistance. 
CHAPTER 6 
INTERNAL FACTORS THAT PREVENTED BLACK NATIONALISTS 
FROM FOUNDING A BLACK NATION-STATE 
This chapter will discuss those internal factors that prevented black nationalists of 
the Black Power Era (BPE), namely the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC), the Black Panther Party for Self Defense (BPP), and the Provisional 
Government of the Republic of New Africa (PGRNA) from establishing an independent 
nation-state. There will also be a discussion of black nationalists' neglect and rejection 
of the black church as central to the failure of the black nationalist movement to found a 
nation-state. Internal factors are defined as leadership and organizational decisions, 
strategies, and circumstances that were under the direct control of black nationalists 
themselves. The author does recognize that there were also external factors, such as 
COINTELPRO and police violence that also prevented black nationalists from founding 
a black nation-state, but even in the face of these challenges, black nationalists could 
have achieved their ultimate goal had internal weaknesses not dismantled them from 
within. 
Specifically, the chapter will discuss and critique critical decisions made by each 
of the three organizations mentioned above. These decisions include; 1) SNCC's 
abandonment of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, 2) the ideological shift of 
the BPP fiom its support of independent statehood to the ideology of inter-communalism, 
3) the decision of the PGRNA to change its strategy from pursuing the takeover of the 
sheriffs offices in the black belt south through the electoral process to declaring 
themselves a "nation in fact", and 4) the split between Gaidi Obadele and Imari Obadele 
to move the government headquarters of the PGRNA to Jackson, Mississippi. The 
decisions reveal some of the weaknesses of these nationalist organizations and the black 
nationalist movement as a whole. They are, by themselves, not inclusive of all the 
internal factors that contributed to the failure of black nationalists to found a state. 
However, the decisions discussed had a major impact on the political direction of each 
organization and its contribution to achieving self-determination for black people and 
establishing an independent nation-state. The neglect of the Black Church by black 
nationalists and its consequences is the final factor discussed and has broader 
implications on the failure of the larger black nationalist movement. 
Before moving forward into the specific decisions, it is necessary to clarify each 
organizations specific position in relation to black nationalism and the goal of 
independent nationhood. SNCC began as a civil rights group that later switched its 
position on the pursuit of integration to the more nationalist objectives of achieving 
political power through the formation of an independent political party that would operate 
within the American political system. After breaking away fiom the CRM, SNCC 
advocated for greater black autonomy-which they implemented organizationally by 
expelling all their white members, seeking community control of institutions, and 
increasing cultural awareness. SNCC never had a formal position on the establishment of 
a black nation-state, but its members did support the nationalist objectives of self- 
determination. 
In 1966, as part of their ten point platform, the BPP called for a United Nations 
supervised plebiscite to determine the national will of black people to either establish a 
nation-state of their own or remain citizens of the United States of America. The BPP 
never took a decisive stand as an organization in support of founding a black nation-state, 
although they included a demand for land in their ten point platform as well. The 
demand for land, however, was considered more for its economic value as a natural 
resource, rather than for its political value in establishing a separate nation for black 
people. 
The RWB was the only organization that took a decisive position on the 
establishment of an independent nation-state. Their demand for land was for the political 
purpose of establishing a separate nation-state for black people. As such, the EWA 
represents the purest sentiment of black nationalism which seeks to achieve self- 
determination for black people through the establishment of a separate independent 
nation-state. 
Official positions aside, all three organizations represent the general thrust of 
black nationalism toward self-determination and independent statehood that was central 
to the Black Power Movement. Their activities, programs, and leaders clearly reflect a 
continuum of black nationalists' aspirations and development. These organizations were 
part of a larger black nationalist movement that expressed a great deal of support for the 
establishment of an independent nation-state, as well as greater community control of 
institutions, building separate institutions, generating a black-controlled economy, and 
adopting traditional African culture and values. As a result part of the discussion on the 
internal factors that prevented black nationalists from founding a nation-state, suggests 
how these organizations could have benefited from the specific programs and activities of 
each other toward achieving self-determination and independent statehood. 
In 1965, the members of SNCC made a decisive move to break away from the 
integrationist Civil Rights Movement (CRM) and pursue the nationalist objective of 
building an independent black political party that would select its own candidates to run 
far political office.' SNCC had the experience of conducting political work in the deep- 
south based upon their CRM activities that started with the sit-ins and progressed to 
voter-registration drives throughout the south.2 After becoming frustrated with the idea 
of integration and being introduced to the nationalist theories of Malcolm X, SNCC 
implemented Malcolm's call for the development of an all black political party that 
would work to get blacks elected to political office, who would then represent and be 
held accountable by their black constituency .3 
As discussed in the text, Ready for Revolution, SNCC was successful at getting a 
significant number of black citizens in Lowndes County to participate in the development 
of the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO) and ran their own slate of 
candidates in the 1966 county elections.' SNCC had done their homework in choosing 
Lowndes County as the place to begin their independent political work. Lowndes County 
was 83% black and had one of the worst reputations of brutality and 
racism in the south that made, " . . both blacks and whites to shudder . . . . "5 SNCC 
spent a year organizing, getting black citizens in Lowndes County registered to vote, 
providing political education classes, and preparing those citizens who were selected to 
run for office with the information and skills necessary to perform their duties-if and 
when they were elected. However, in the end, none of the candidates from the LCFO 
were elected. SNCC, consequently, abandoned the project after the elections. They did 
not consider the organizing of an independent political party and registration of thousands 
of newly enfranchised black voters significant enough to continue with the development 
of the LCFO. SNCC aborted the project to move its headquarters to Chicago and focus 
on political development in the urban n ~ h . ~  
The abandonment of the LCFO project-the abandoning of political projects 
which did not yield immediate gain-is one of the reasons black nationalists of the BPE 
failed to establish a black state. Although SNCC was not organizing specifically to 
establish a black state, they had adopted the nationalist strategy advocated by Malcolm X 
of forming an independent political party. At this stage in the development of black 
nationalist efforts to found an independent state, the creation of a vehicle for blacks to 
gain control over the politics affecting them in the form of an independent black political 
party was a step in the right direction. The formation of an independent political party 
under oppressive conditions is a strategy that many nationalists of other racial and ethnic 
groups have employed to better position themselves to make the transition to becoming a 
sovereign The intent of developing an independent political party was to 
increase black political power, which was believed to be one of the means that would 
lead to black liberation and future black sovereign nationhood. When SNCC abandoned 
the effort after one year, they abandoned the greatest potential that blacks had of 
achieving political power in an area that would later be identified by black nationalists as 
the territory of the new black state. SNCC also abandoned the people who invested their 
time, energy, and faith in the idea that they could liberate themselves by exercising their 
political power. Through the LCFO, SNCC had the opporhmity to begin developing a 
support base for black nationalists to found a black state in the future. This was very 
important and strategic to the f3ture of black nationalism because at the time black 
nationalism had its largest support base in the north. Blacks in the south were more 
supportive of the integrationist efforts of the CRM and not as familiar or supportive of 
the rhetoric and programs of black nationalists. It would require a sustained effort of 
political education that SNCC had begun in Lowndes County to build support among the 
masses of black people in the black belt, who were more familiar with the teachings of 
Martin Luther King Jr. versus those of Malcolm X. 
SNCC had already experienced that the people were open and receptive to the 
ideas of black nationalism by their efforts to form their own independent political party 
and their preparedness and willingness to defend themselves, black leaders, and their 
movement. SNCC introduced the people to the formal ideology of black nationalism via 
the recorded speeches of Malcolm x.' Malcolm's commentary resonated soundly with 
the experiences that black people had in the south just as it did with urban blacks in the 
north. The combination of a new black social consciousness, SNCC's political education 
process, a practical political program with the human resources to carry it out, were good 
indicators of the success that could have been achieved toward advancing an explicit 
nationalist agenda throughout the southern black belt region. 
Instead of continuing the work SNCC left. Rather than staying to build where 
there was power in numbers and where black people could realistically contend for 
absolute political power, SNCC opted out for pursuing political power in the urban north 
where blacks had exercised their right to vote, but were at a numerical disadvantage and 
had limited access to natural resources, for state development, that were readily available 
in the south. Also, blacks in the urban north were isolated in small pockets of power that 
could easily be contained or out maneuvered as they were a distinct minority in the 
The reason for SNCC7s decision to abandon the LCFO, and move their operations 
to the north, was predicated on the perception that the new frontier for Black Power was 
in the north. After the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act SNCC realized that the 
Voting Rights Act did nothing to improve the plight of African-Americans living in the 
urban ghettoes of the north. Afi-ican-Americans in the north already had the right to vote, 
but were still suffering from extreme poverty and discrimination in key areas of daily life 
(housing, law enforcement, education, business development, and employment). The 
leadership of SNCC felt that their efforts had run its course in the south where the major 
battles to end segregation and the right to vote had been won. Conversely, the outbreak 
of the urban riots, that began in Watts in 1965 and spread throughout the country for 
several years, shifted SNCC's attention away from the south to the north. As SNCC 
began to work out its new position as a Black Power-black nationalist organization, the 
north appeared to be more receptive to the new agenda that SNCC wanted to implement. 
Had SNCC continued to build and develop the LCFO from 1965 through the 
PGRNA's move south, in 1970, black nationalists would have had a stronger foothold to 
continue to build from in other areas of the identified national territory (South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia). The experience, lessons, and success that 
SNCC had could have been replicated by other black nationalist groups or as one black 
nationalist operation to gain political power and control in the black belt. 
This would have also been critical to the success of both the original BPP and the 
RNA's plan to hold national-United Nation's supervised plebiscites to determine the 
national destiny of black people in the United States. An independent black political 
party, with its roster of registered voters and other demographic information, would have 
been essential for black nationalists to carry out a plebiscite vote. An independent 
political party would have laid the ground work in training blacks to organize local 
elections, registering people to vote, educating the masses of blacks about their political 
rights as a national group, and defending black people's right to self-determination-via 
the vote. These skills, along with established and experienced organization and 
leadership, would have made the success of a national-United Nations supervised 
plebiscite more plausible and possible. There is no way to know how much progress 
SNCC could have made in those 3-5 years toward moving black people in the south to 
greater political power and overall organization to achieve the nationalist objective of 
independent statehood, but it is certain that the work and experience would have 
increased black nationalists' capabilities to succeed in the local political arena and 
continue that success to the state and national level. 
The ultimate failure of SNCC to advance the development of black political 
independence in the south was due to a lack of maturity and understanding of what 
constitutes real power. The general membership of SNCC was very young, generally the 
same age as traditional college students, which explains the lack of maturity necessary to 
see beyond the immediate circumstances. A higher level of maturity would have allowed 
SNCC leadership to develop a long-term plan that would have taken advantage of the 
political activism that had been built-up in the south through the CRM and channeled it 
into the next phase of black political development. SNCC had witnessed the shift in 
focus from integration to Black Power which manifested in the form of f i c a n -  
Americans working for black political independence and an overall black nationalist 
agenda for self-determination and an independent nation. 
SNCC, also, did not have an understanding of the patience required for the steady 
growth of power to take place. The mood and political climate of the south had been 
changed and there was an opportunity for black people, where they were a majority, to 
claim political power. SNCC, through the LCFO, had an opportunity to build a firm 
foundation for Black Power to take root and blossom throughout the black belt region. 
The work that was necessary to make it happen may not have gained national media 
attention or propelled young-activist leaders into household names, but the value of the 
work in making a tangible difference in the lives of black people would have been 
tremendous. 
SNCC was not the onIy Black Power organization that lacked maturity and 
understanding. The BPP was also led by very young-militant leaders who lacked the 
ability to develop a long range perspective on what it would take to fulfill their mission to 
bring an end to the oppression faced by black people. This lack of maturity expressed 
itself as over zealousness and in the disassociation of the BPP &om the nationalist 
objective of founding an independent state. In 1966, when the BPP was founded, they 
were an advocate for the establishment of a black nation and had included the demand for 
land and a United Nations (UN) supervised plebiscite vote as part of their ten point 
platform.10 The shift came in 1968 when Huey Newton officially shifted the BPP 
political and social positiori to one of inter-communalism. The shift to inter- 
communalism focused on the development of political coalitions with various ethnic and 
racial groups that would work toward a socialist revolution to liberate black people and 
all other oppressed people as well." In 1970, Newton's analysis concluded that blacks 
could not achieve liberation without the support of the white-radical left. He based his 
conclusion on the changes in the global economic market and concluded that the modern 
nation-state was obsolete.12 
This shift in ideology was not simply a matter of choosing inter-communalism 
over black nationalism as the best method to achieve black liberation. The political and 
social context of the BPP was significant to the ideological changes the organization 
experienced. The leadership of the BPP was based in northern California, specifically 
Oakland, and historically black nationalism had its roots in the south, urban northeast, 
and midwest. The geographical distance from the historical and cultural roots of black 
nationalism gave Huey Newton and Bobby Seale a different view of black oppression 
that was not influenced as much by history as by current circumstances. Newton 
embraced and emphasized the revolutionary teachings of Mao Tse-tung and Franz Fanon 
over those of Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X. In terms of implementation, this translated 
into the mandatory reading of Mao Tse-tung's, The Red Book, and Franz Fanon7s, The 
Wretched of the Earth, as opposed to the study of Gamey and the Universal Negro 
Improvement Association (UNIA) and the nationalist theories of Malcolm X. The BPP 
never instituted black nationalist history and theory as a fundamental part of their 
program.13 The BPP placed a heavy emphasis on class as the central issue to black 
oppression as opposed to race. Capitalism and imperialism were viewed as the ultimate 
enemies to be defeated in the quest for black liberation. As a result, they rejected the 
idealism associated with African history, culture, and solidarity that was intrinsic to most 
black nationalist teachings and organizations. 
The BPP's rejection of African history and culture as relevant to black liberation 
formed the ideological basis for the friction that developed between the BPP and US 
(Maulana Karenga's organization). The BPP's hostile disagreement with cultural 
nationalism, which espoused the need for black people to reclaim their African culture, 
traditions, and history through a variety of programs, emphasizing African customs, 
religion, language, and art was criticized as being counter-rev~lutionary.'~ BPP literature 
was very critical of those who embraced cultural nationalism by wearing dashikis and 
natural hairstyles, taking on African names, and seeking to incorporate African customs 
into their daily lives. This was considered counter-revolutionary by the BPP because, in 
their opinion, a return to old Ahcan culture was not going to liberate black people from 
their current oppression,'5 which, according to Newton and the BPP was the result of 
capitalism and European-American imperialism. Taking this viewpoint into account, not 
simply as an ideological debate, but one that often-times escalated into violence and the 
eventual split between west coast and east coast BPP leadership and members, indicates 
that Newton's ideological shift had other implications that need to be addressed. 
Politically, coalitions with white radicals focused on capitalism and imperialism 
as the true enemies that had created black oppression as well as the oppression of all 
poor-working class people, regardless of race. l6 Ultimately, the shift in ideology changed 
the goal of land and political sovereignty to the goal of the destruction of the American 
capitalist system by means of a socialist revolution that sought to take over the means of 
production from the wealthy ruling class and place them under the control of the working 
class proletariat in the form of a socialist Huey Newton and the BPP 
believed this to be the path toward true black liberation. 
Black nationalism and Black Power, in particular, were criticized by socialists as 
being incorrectly focused on race as the basis of black oppression and therefore 
inaccurate in terms of addressing the root cause of oppression, which was ultimately a 
class issue. Black nationalism was seen by socialists as being susceptible to the same 
system of class oppression, especially when some Black Power advocates supported the 
development of black capitalism to address the need for blacks to become economically 
independent. The BPP rejected this concept and argued that black capitalism would 
prove to be just as exploitive of the poor and working class as white capitalism, only 
changing the color of the oppressor fi-om white to black. In essence, the BPP believed 
that black people could not be liberated without a joint effort by all poor and working 
class people to destroy the Euro-American capitalist system. So, what began as a demand 
for Black Power in the form of land and self-determination for black people was changed 
to a demand for "Power to the People" (inter-communalism). 
Strategically, this would serve Newton and the west coast BPP because they were, 
not only seeking to exert leadership as the revolutionary vanguard for the liberation of 
black people, but to be the leaders of the socialist-revolutionary vanguard of all people. 
Recognizing that they were far outnumbered by white radical groups, who were focused 
on the peace movement to end the war in Vietnam and who identified themselves as 
socialist revolutionaries determined to destroy capitalism and imperialism, Newton 
sought to build his alliances with them by advocating a purely socialist ideology that he 
believed to be more applicable to achieving black liberation. This stood in direct 
opposition to the teachings and ideology of black nationalism, espoused by Marcus 
Gamey, Elijah Muhammad, and Malcolm X which, fundamentally, linked independent 
nationhood to black liberation. 
Another area of concern to be addressed in Newton and the BPP's shift from the 
goal of self-determination to inter-communalism was Newton's personal issues with 
leadership, power, and authority with other black leaders within the black nationalist 
movement. The antagonism that existed between Maulana Karenga's US organization 
and the west coast BPP has already been mentioned, but there were other situations with 
black leaders that were just as hostile and violent. The suspension of Eldridge Cleaver 
and the Harlem Chapter of the BPP'*, the attack on James  orm man'^, and edgy relations 
with Stokely Carmichael all speak to the problems that Newton and the BPP had with 
other black nationalist leaders and organizations who expressed different political 
viewpoints than their own. The manner in which disagreements and challenges to 
Newton's authority were dealt with, were at the least intimidating and, at their extreme, 
deadly. As a result, Newton and the BPP strayed away from the idea set forth by 
Malcolm X, regarding blacks coming together to form a black revolutionary army, and 
placed their self-proclaimed identity as vanguard above establishing a cohesive and 
unified black nationalist revolutionary front. 
In 1964, Malcolm X spoke of blacks coming together and forming either an all- 
black political party or an all black revolutionary army.20 As mentioned above, SNCC 
took the lead in forming an all-black political party, which they later abandoned.. The 
BPP took up the call to form an all black revolutionary army. In considering the things 
that are necessary for an independent state to exist, military capability and preparedness 
is one key aspect. The BPP played a critical role in galvanizing the young and militant 
members of the black community and directing their energy and enthusiasm for 
immediate liberation into a formidable organization. 
Founded in 1966, the BPP grew rapidly, and by 1967, had gained national media 
attention as the most powerful revolutionary-nationalist organization in the United 
By late October 1967, the organization was heavily involved in the "Free Huey" 
campaign, in which Huey Newton was charged and jailed for the murder of a white 
Oakland police officer.22 The trial and imprisonment of Newton increased the notoriety 
of the BPP substantially, which caused chapters and membership to flourish across the 
country. As membership and chapters increased, so did the arming of young African- 
American men and women who claimed the role as the revolutionary vanguard for the 
liberation of African-American people. The charismatic young leadership and 
disciplined appearance of the BPP inspired black people, particularly the young, to 
volunteer their lives and bodies to form an army for the liberation of black people. It was 
also a powerful attraction for thousands of young African-Americans who were fed up 
with seeing whites brutalizing blacks on television and in their own communities and 
nothing being done about it. 
When the BPP changed its political and social orientation to one that ideologically 
opposed the formation of an independent black state, they removed the greatest potential 
and opportunity that black nationalists had in building a formidable military force that 
was capable of training and preparing an entire generation of black people to be soldiers 
that would defend the nation, its leaders, and people. As a national phenomenon, the 
BPP had chapters all across the country and were well-received by blacks in their local 
communities, for not only being protectors, but providers as well. Their free breakfast 
program and educational program met a sincere need in the black community.23 In doing 
so, the people took pride in the BPP as their new-found heroes who took action to combat 
racist police violence against blacks and to work at the grassroots level to become 
intimately connected to the community. 
In looking at black nationalism as a whole and considering the work of SNCC in 
organizing the LCFO and the work of the BPP in building an organized military 
operation, the two working together to advance black nationalists toward statehood would 
have been tremendous. The BPP could have worked alongside SNCC and the LCFO to 
protect black citizens as well as to import the phlosophy and activities of revolutionary 
black nationalism into the deep-south where black people had the numbers and 
experience of being at war with the white power structure in the south. 
Although Stokely Carrnichael and SNCC were aware of the developments taking 
place with the formation of the BPP, they did not seek to build a collaborative effort. 
Newton's only interests in the LCFO was the right to use their chosen mascot-the black 
panther-as the name and symbol of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. Newton 
and Bobby Seale contacted Carrnichael to gain his permission to use the symbol for their 
organization, but there was no discussion concerning the two organizations working 
together to advance the overall pursuit of black political power and independence. 
Shortly thereafter the LCFO was abandoned by SNCC. 
Along these same lines the BPP would have provided a powerful resource to the 
RNA in its initial plan to take control of the sheriff offices of the black belt by protecting 
black voters, providing training for newly elected black sheriffs and their deputies, as 
well as serving as sheriffs and deputies themselves. This would have tied the BPP to a 
source of legitimately recognized police power for the benefit of black people and the 
movement toward establishing an independent state. The BPP could have also engaged 
the leadership and the members of the Deacons for Defense, who were very successful at 
combating white violence during the CRM. The organizational discipline and stealth of 
the Deacons for Defense would have gone a long way to temper and channel the militant 
spirit of the BPP into a powerful revolutionary force. More importantly, the BPP's 
militant spirit could have been applied in an area where black people had strength in 
numbers and a justifiable claim to the land as their national-territory. 
However, the relationship of the BPP and the RNA was somewhat problematic. 
The RNA had embraced cultural nationalism as part of their overall program to build a 
New African nation. The RNA also held onto their position of establishing an 
independent nation for black people. Newton did write a letter to Robert Williams 
expressing a desire for the two organizations to work together despite their conflicting 
views on independent statehood and cultural nationalism, but no relationship was ever 
formalized or actively pursued. 
The BPP and the Deacons for Defense never had a chance to work together 
because the BPP did not focus its organizational development in the south, instead 
focusing its energy on the urban north and west. The Deacons for Defense were a 
southern based-clandestine group whose purpose was to defend Civil Rights activists as 
they worked throughout the south. How the two groups would have been able to work 
out their organizational differences in uncertain. The Deacons for Defense acted solely 
as a defense organization, where as the BPP was both interested in defense and political 
development. 
The BPP and SNCC were not the only black nationalist organizations to make 
critical errors in the pursuit of black independent nationhood. Similar to the lack of 
maturity and understanding of SNCC and the over zealousness of the BPP was the 
strategic abandonment by the PGRNA to follow through and implement its initial plan of 
gaining control of the sheriff offices in the southern black belt.. This would have been a 
first step toward increasing black political power by obtaining legally recognized police 
power. Initially, Imari outlined a strategy of using the electoral process to get black men 
elected as sheriffs in counties where blacks could numerically out-vote whites. Imari 
Obadele in the second draft of, War in America- the Malcolm X Doctrine, discusses the 
change in strategy in the following excerpt, 
But the founding of the Republic of New Africa called for revision of a 
basic concept: in War, written a year and a half before the founding, 
envisioned that the Malcolrnites would work within the governmental 
framework and state structure of the United States, winning black people, 
first in Mississippi, to the cause of independent land and power, follow 
this with election victories (the sheriffs offices, particularly) within the 
U.S. federal system, and finally take the black state out of the U.S. federal 
union at the moment when white power could no longer be successfully 
resisted or neutralized in its efforts to prevent the creation of a new society 
in the black state. 
The founding of the Republic obsoleted this approach - and this revision 
of War makes note of that obsoleteness. By declaration the na t i~n  has 
become a fact - though subjugated by the United 
The initial strategy was to take over the sheriffs offices as a means of obtaining black 
military and police power inside the national territory. Elected sheriffs would have 
inherited the power to deputize blacks and in the process put an end to police and white 
racist violence. This would have enhanced the ability of blacks to defend themselves 
from U.S. state and federal military and police forces when the time came for the RNA to 
remove itself fiom the U.S. federal union and exercise its rights as a sovereign 
independent nation-state. 
Once again black nationalists had done their homework and identified the black 
belt counties of the south to begin their work, specifically in Mississippi. These counties 
had overwhelmingly majority black populations, as high as 8.5% in some cases2', and the 
people had suffered under white racism and brutality long enough to support a change in 
political power to their advantage. This plan, however, was never pursued due to a 
change in strategy. The 1968 Black Government Conference had declared the RNA a 
'nation in fact'. The delegates attending the conference agreed with Imari Obadele and 
felt that it was either unnecessary or contradictory to pursue police power through the 
electoral process and at the same time declare the nation independent. They concluded 
that all that was necessary was for the PGRNA to inform black people that they now had 
their own nation and to educate them concerning their political right to choose their 
national destiny by holding a national-United Nations supervised plebiscite.26 Securing 
sheriffs offices and being able to deputize black men was replaced by the hype of a 
declaration of independence without the means to secure or defend it. This was definitely 
a mistake on the part of the PGRNA. 
When the PGRNA abandoned their initial plan to take control of the sherifrs 
offices through the electoral process, they gave up a very viable means of obtaining real 
power, both politically and militarily. In the event that they would have succeeded in one 
county, or all of them, the police power that they would have obtained would have been a 
vital tool in eliminating police and white racist violence with black sheriffs and deputies. 
This accomplishment alone would have ensured the trust and loyalty of blacks in the 
south specifically, and in the north, as a sign of progress toward gaining state power. It 
would have encouraged support for the PGRNA's agenda for independent statehood with 
tangible and meaningful results. One can only imagine what the results would have been 
with black sheriffs wielding the power to deputize black men. The impact is clearly seen 
when one remembers the role the Deacons for Defense played in protecting civil rights 
workers and curbing white racist violence.27 
Another way to look at the feasibility of the initial plan is to consider the 
readiness of many black youth in the north to act on their militant beliefs. Just as the 
BPP capitalized on the desire for black men and women to take up arms in defense of 
their communities, without any legal authority, the PGRNA would have been able to 
empower black men and women living in the south, with legal authority. The PGRNA 
could have used the potential to elect black sheriffs to develop a recruitment campaign 
for black men and women, living in the north and west, to come to the south to be 
politically educated, trained, and deputized.. This could have been conducted in the same 
fashion as the federal government's recruitment and drafting of black men to join the 
U.S. military to fight in Vietnam. That would have been a powerful demonstration of 
black nationalists exercising state power as a governmental body. 
By abandoning the initial plan to put blacks in power as sheriffs in the black belt, 
the RNA was premature and over zealous in believing that all that was necessary after the 
declaration of independence was information, education, and the holding of a nationally 
supervised election. The sheriffs office was tangible to irnrnediateIy affecting the lives 
of the thousands of black people who lived in any given county of the black belt. It was 
an office that the people understood to have real consequences over their lives. The 
impact of working with the people to put one of their own in a position of legally 
recognized power and authority would have psychologically and politically empowered 
the people, and put some substance behind the rhetoric of the black nationalist agenda of 
independent statehood. 
To abandon any plan that was viable to increasing black political power in areas 
where the impaci: wouid have proved beneficial toward achieving black statehood was 
extremely immature on the part of black nationalists. At that early point in the pursuit of 
statehood, black nationalists had no legally recognized power and the abandoned 
program of SNCC and abandoned strategy of the PGRNA were two methods to obtain it. 
This would also have provided the opportunity for black nationalists to gain practical 
experience in implementing the various strategies and programs to achieve independence. 
The ability to achieve the combination of black political and police power was very 
realistic. Black nationalism was at its height between 1967 and 1970 with the founding 
of the PGRNA, the holding of national black conferences, the geometric growth of the 
BPP, and the continuation of revolts of the urban masses. The black nation was poised to 
receive strategic direction that was based upon the acquisition of real power. The 
PGRNA had a viable plan that was never implemented, and as a result black nationalists 
continued to offer more rhetoric and militant posturing than tangible results. 
Another example of immaturity and over zealousness of black nationalists that 
contributed to the failure of the PGRNA to establish an independent black nation was the 
organization's decision to move the headquarters of the RNA from Detroit to Jackson in 
May, 1970.~' A rift had already developed within the leadership of the RNA,. There was 
some disagreement concerning the political and military development of the young 
government. Imari was pushing for the RNA to take decisive action toward moving the 
government and its operations into the south (i.e., the national territory). Imari also 
wanted to build the Black Legionnaires into a 100,000 men defensive force.19 These two 
points were not agreeable to Gaidi and several other cabinet members, who held the 
opinion that the RNA should continue to function primarily in the north. Gaidi did not 
support the building of a large military force because he believed it would draw too much 
attention to the RNA as a violent threat to the U..S. and give the U.S. government a reason 
to attack the RNA before the young government was capable of responding and defeating 
such an attack. Gaidi and other cabinet members were also opposed to moving the 
headquarters of the RNA to Mississippi, arguing that it was premature and that there was 
not enough support in the south for the RNA to be effective in meeting its goals and 
overall ~bjective.~' 
Gaidi's position had a great deal of merit. The RNA had not been in existence for 
very long and they needed to build a firm foundation of financial and political support to 
achieve recognition as a government prior to moving into the south. The political and 
financial base of the RNA was in Detroit and other northern and western urban centers 
(i.e., New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, D.C., Los Angeles, and 
San Francisco). There was no base support established in the south and black 
nationalism had not become a household word among black southerners as it had among 
blacks in the north. Gaidi was interested in continuing to build on the established 
northern support for black nationalism, which would eventually lead to a move into the 
south at a later date. Based on the events and outcome of the "shootout" with the Detroit 
police, there was strong evidence to support Gaidi7s position. The RNA had support in 
Detroit fiom major black politicians, a powerful judge, well-known ministers, and local 
citizens." Simply put, the RNA was strongly supported in Detroit. The financial support 
that the RNA could count on to buy bonds and land certificates would come from other 
black nationalists who were primarily based in the north, as opposed to the south. A 
strong nationalist movement had yet to be developed in the south at that point. The urban 
north and west was the hot bed of African-American discontent as displayed by the 
number of riots that took place in many of the cities where the RNA established 
consulates (i.e., New York, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, D.C., 
and Philadelphia). It was from the urban north and west that the RNA found the majority 
of its citizens and supporters; it was logical, then, that the majority of the financial and 
political support would come from these same areas. 
Imari and those who supported moving south argued that the government needed 
to function within the national territory. There was a lot of work to be done to win the 
consent of blacks in the south to acknowledge the RNA as their government of choice. 
The RNA had specifically identified the five southern states of South Carolina, Georgia, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana as the home of the new black nation, although it 
was subjugated territory (i.e., under U.S. federal jurisdiction and military control) The 
primary work to be done concerning winning the consent of the people was in the south 
Preparing to hold a plebiscite, educating people about the RNA, and gaining their support 
could not be done effectively from Detroit, New York, or Los Angeles. The work had to 
be done in the national territory in order for the RNA to build a base of support in the 
south to fulfill its primary objective of building an independent nation. It was a basic 
assumption of the RNA that the majority of black people, particularly in the south, would 
choose to support the RNA as their government versus continuing to live under the 
oppressive conditions imposed upon them by the U.S. at all levels of government. That 
assumption needed to be tested and worked out by practical and tangible means. Imari 
was pushing for the RNA to become a government in fact, which meant exercising 
authority over a territory for black people. He and his supporters believed that they were 
ready to take a more direct approach to make the RNA a functional reality. 
The disagreement resulted in Gaidi suspending Imari from his post as Regional 
Vice President and Minister of the ~ n t e r i o r . ~ ~  Although the seriousness of the 
disagreement was played down by Imari in the local newspaper in which he stated, "It 
happens in governments all the time . . . It's a normal procedure. Cabinet members have 
been suspended before but just because Gaidi is my brother it has been made to appear 
there is a rift between us." The "rift" led to the forming of a Constitutional Committee 
which held an emergency election in January 1970 to elect a new RNA president and 
cabinet.33 
Imari won the election and the RNA moved its headquarters first to New Orleans 
and then to Jackson in May, 1970. Gaidi and his supporters seem to have dissolved their 
involvement and support of the RNA after the election, whereas, in the past, the two 
brothers had worked hand in glove to build two previous organizations (i.e., Group on 
Advanced Leadership and the Malcolm X Society), they parted ways at a pivotal point in 
the development of the RNA and black nationalism. 
The decision to move the headquarters of the RNA to Jackson was strategically a 
bad decision. As a government, the RNA was barely two years in existence and as Gaidi 
pointed out the RNA did not have the base support in the south, as they did in the north. 
That does not discredit the need for more intense work that needed to be done in the 
south, but that did not require the entire government operation to be moved to the south. 
What the RNA should have done, to serve the needs of the RNA and the founding of an 
independent state, is to deploy Imari and a group of RNA government workers to Jackson 
to begin working more intensely in the south while maintaining the headquarters, intact, 
in Detroit. The model that the RNA should have used was to view Detroit and the urban 
north and west as the mother country, in the sense that it was in these places that the 
FWA had its greatest political and financial resources, along with a solid support base. 
The south should have been considered a colony where black nationalist missionaries 
could be sent to lay the groundwork for the development of the south as the national 
territory. The goal would have been to build up a black nationalist support base that 
would eventually be able to sustain the existence of the RNA in a violently hostile 
environment. The Detroit headquarters and the urban areas could have focused on 
continuing to build on the broad base of support they had established in the north to 
increase their financial resources and political power. Those financial resources could go 
toward funding black nationalist missionary operations in the south and the fund raising 
activities could serve as a vehicle to continue to build their political power that would 
give them the necessary influence they needed on a national and international level. By 
using the mother country-colony strategy, the RNA would still have been able to 
accomplish the goal of becoming more heavily involved in the national territory while 
still maintaining its base of power and strength in Detroit. 
Once the split occurred, there was a missing link between two vital components of 
the young government. Gaidi represented the older more conservative and established 
black nationalist constituency and Imari represented the younger more energetic and 
militant constituency34. The two needed to work together to fulfill the mission of 
establishing an independent nation-state. Gaidi and his supporters were not willing to 
take the risks that Imari and his supporters were willing to take in moving south. On the 
other side of the coin was the fact that Gaidi and his supporters had the inroads to 
financial and political support that Imari and his supporters did not. Both were necessary 
to make the government work, the eventual split based on differences in strategy was 
pivotal in the eventual failure of the RNA to carry out its plans of establishing an 
independent nation-state in the deep south. 
On a broader scale of analysis in determining the factors that prevented black 
nationalist from founding a black state, one must examine the failure of black nationalists 
to embrace the Black Church as critical to the success of mobilizing and 
sustaining a large mass movement among African-Americans. Due to its synonymous 
relationship with Christianity, and Christianity often being dubbed a pacifist religion on 
the one hand and a white man's religion on the other, the power of the Black Church was 
either ignored or rejected outright as many black nationalists deemed it responsible for 
the continued oppression of black people.35 Historically, Christianity was the religion 
whites used to enslave Africans and therefore was viewed as problematic if not 
absolutely contradictory to the goal of black independence and statehood. Christianity 
was viewed by radical nationalists as a collaborating theology that supported white 
supremacy and black subordination. Christianity, as it was taught to black people by 
whites during slavery and preached to black people by black ministers after slavery was 
not able to reconcile the doctrine of brotherhood of all men with the political and social 
oppression that black people experienced at the hands of whites, who also claimed to be 
Christians themselves. Malcolm X pointed out the contradiction plainly when he stated 
that when a black man was being lynched and prayed to God-Jesus to save him, he was 
praying to the same God-Jesus that the white lynch mob was praying to kill him.36 In 
response to this religious assault against black people, and the obvious insanity of praying 
and worshiping the same God as their oppressor, black nationalists of the BPE 
embraced Islam and African religious traditions as more consistent with black 
nationalists goals and objectives, and consequently rejected a viable ally. 
The Nation of Islam (NOI) and the following that Malcolm X generated is largely 
responsible for the acceptance of Islam. The popularity of the "black Muslim" movement 
brought notoriety to the NOI, by its condemnation of whites as devils and the belief that 
Allah (God) was going to destroy white people in the coming Armageddon.37 The NOT 
offered one of the major challenges to Christianity as a religious and spiritual alternative 
for black people. Islam was also consistent with the Judeo-Christian origins of God and 
the prophets that black people were very familiar with. Using the traditional preaching 
style of the Black Church to instill moral character, religious conviction, and the ideology 
of black nationalism, the NO1 chastised black people for believing in Jesus as a " . . . 
white blue-eyed devil . . .", while at the same time teaching and honoring the historical 
truth that Jesus was racially black.38 The denial of Jesus as white but embracing him as 
black is a dichotomy that black nationalists failed to reconcile in order for them to 
effectively incorporate and acknowledge that the Black Church was vital to the success of 
the nationalist movement. 
The Black Church was founded out of a combination of two spiritual traditions, 
African ritual-worship and Christian t h e ~ l o ~ ~ . ~ % e f t  to African people the two are not 
incompatible, but when white and black preachers employed the teachings of Christianity 
to encourage black people to bide their time on earth for the reward of the afterlife, they 
were rejected by black people who believed that liberation was to come in their lifetime. 
As a consequence, religion was divided into black and white, Islam and African culture- 
religion were black and therefore supportive of black nationalist objectives and 
Christianity was white and rejected by black nationalists. 
The Black Church failed to challenge the hypocrisy and blatant lie held by the 
white church and white Christians that Jesus and the prophets were white, and black 
nationalists failed to recognize that the Black Church was aesthetically and culturally 
African, and the most powerful institution in the black community.. The reconciliation of 
the two extremes would have allowed the Black Church to assume its proper role of 
providing spiritual leadership to black nationalists, a leadership necessary in order to 
address the spiritual and moral soundness of their attempts to found a nation, as well as 
being able to address the spiritual and moral inconsistencies found within the black 
nationalist movement. 
Another area that played a role in the general neglect of spirituality-religion in the 
black nationalist movement is the emphasis on the political and economic ideologies of 
socialism. Socialist and communist political-economic theory was based on John Engels 
and Karl Mam's theory of Dialectical Materialism and its explanation of the natural order 
of the universe and the relationship of man to hisher en~ironrnent.'~ Engels and Marx 
were Europeans and their theory was meant to address the issues faced by Europe's 
industrial poor-working class, who were being exploited by European capitalists. Black 
nationalists saw the value in the socialist explanation of how economic forces dictated the 
societal ills of race, class, and sexist oppression. Yet, Engels, Mam and black 
nationalists who accepted this analysis of political and economic theory failed to 
recognize that the history and culture of African-Americans demands recognition of God 
as a fundamental pre-requisite for an ideology to resonate with black people, who hold 
spiritual things to be inseparable from their understanding of the world and man's 
relationship to God and other menlwomen. Socialism and communism took God out of 
the picture and replaced it with sterile calculated reasoning, which went against the grain 
of the African ethos. Black nationalists failed to restructure socialist ideology to be 
compatible with the spiritual-religious center of black people. 
Although black nationalists had a rationale for rejecting Christianity, the rejection 
of the Black Church and its exclusion from the mainstream of the Black Power 
Movement was very harmful to the black nationalist movement. This was a critical 
failure of black nationalists to found a state due to the fact that it prevented black 
nationalists from developing a spiritual-religious program that was inclusive of the most 
accepted and successful social-cultural-economic institution in the black community-the 
Black Church. It is undeniable that the Black Church was instrumental in galvanizing the 
energy and efforts of black people to build the CRM. As one of the greatest resources for 
the CRM, the Black Church provided a physical space for black people to organize, 
discuss and debate issues, devise plans, motivate and inspire people to step outside of 
their comfort zones, teach people to apply their faith to changing their condition through 
organized action, and to raise money. The CRM took advantage of the deep spiritual 
roots of black people that was stored in their collective memory through song, worship 
style, preaching style, collective suffering and communal support, and built one of the 
most successful movements in world history. 
The Black Church was not altogether removed from the black nationalist agenda 
as a resource, but black Christian liberation theology was never given the serious 
consideration that was needed for it to become central to the black nationalist movement. 
SNCC and the RNA both used Black Churches in which to organize many of their 
programs and activities. When Stokely Carmichael and SNCC workers first began to 
organize the LCFP, they made it a priority to get all the names of the local black pastors 
and to be introduced to the community through the Church to be 'officially7 
sanctioned and accepted to do the work of organizing black people in Lowndes ~ o u n t y . ~ '  
The RNA organized its first and second national convention using the Black Church to 
house its activities." It seems as though black nationalists believed the Church had a 
role to play, but it was not a theological or ideological role, due to it being identified as a 
passive white man's religion. 
In the case of the RNA, the rejection of Christianity may have been the result of a 
decision not to push any particular religious theology, but to embrace all black people 
who supported nationhood regardless of their religion. This is problematic because the 
RNA created ministries to address every area of national activity except a Minister of 
Religion and Spirituality. Some may argue that the minister of culture would have 
covered this area, but the Minister of Culture was by definition more inclined toward 
incorporating and instilling a sense of African cultural values and norms into the process 
of nation-building43, as opposed to developing a black nationalist theology, religion, or 
spiritual system that would serve as the guiding cosmology of the nation and black 
people. 
The most salient and pervasive religious norms of black people in America stem 
from the Black Church. Even the NO1 was subject to the influence of the tradition of the 
Black Church. Elijah Muhammad himself was the product of the black Baptist tradition 
out of rural ~ e o r ~ i a ~ ~ ,  and he, along with all his ministers, maintained a call-and- 
response preaching style, as well as taught his followers from both the Bible and Qur'an. 
The songs that became protest anthems in the CRM were transformations of black 
spirituals and gospel songs well known in the Black Church. The members of SNCC and 
local black people sang songs of protest, inspiration, and redemption that had the full 
characteristics of being Black Church songs.45 The use of prayer to bring those with 
different points of view together to pursue a common action was employed as a way of 
instituting group solidarity.46 Black people's knowledge and familiarity with biblical 
scripture was used to give spiritual significance to the movement and to black activists 
that their work and the liberation of black people was the fulfillment of prophecy, and in 
the end the success of their activities was in God's hands as a matter divine will. More 
importantly the Black Church, as a religious institution, anchored black people in the 
acknowledgement of a spiritual reality that allowed them to face overwhelming obstacles, 
including death, to continue to pursue what they knew was right and just. 
In ignoring the Black Church as a viable organ to support the black nationalist 
agenda, black nationalists were not able to reach the masses of black people. The CRM 
and its leadership used the Black Church and Christianity to inspire and motivate black 
people to support their movement using a cultural reality very common and familiar to 
the majority of Black people. Black people identified themselves with the Black Church 
and Christianity. Black nationalists attacked that identification as opposed to embracing 
it and making it productive toward achieving liberation and independent statehood. 
Instead, black nationalists tried to re-orient the masses of black people toward Islam, 
socialism, and traditional African religion as a way of reconstructing black spiritual- 
religious consciousness, but they did it in a way that fundamentally opposed the accepted 
religious-culture of black people. It was the quintessential act of 'throwing the baby out 
with the bath water'. 
Put simply, the internal factors discussed in this chapter as contributing to the 
failure of black nationalists to found an independent state were immaturity, over 
zealousness, lack of patience and insight into how to develop and sustain power, and the 
inability to carry out long term plans and goals. In the case of SNCC their immaturity is 
displayed in how they approached their work in the south with the LCFO. They were 
more interested in experimenting with challenging white political domination than 
developing a solid foundation from which black political power could be obtained, 
secured, and developed. In their quest to form an all-black independent political party 
without an overall goal to sustain a consistent movement toward nationalist objectives 
they stifled the ability of black nationalists to establish the political and cultural base 
necessary to mobilize the masses of blacks in the south to achieve the nationalist agenda 
of independent nationhood. Their immaturity led them to pursue the development of a 
nationalist agenda in the north where they lacked the very basis of power that existed in 
the south. The CRM had politicized and mobilized blacks in the south and as a result of 
the superficial progress that was made blacks were receptive to nationalists programs and 
ideas as the means to end their oppression and develop as a people. As a result of SNCC 
leaving black nationalists lost a prime opportunity to turn the rhetoric of Black Power 
into a physical reality. 
The PGRNA was much more ambitious and detailed in creating a theory for 
nationalist development and attempting to put its theoretical assumptions into practice. 
Their failure was due to a lack of insight, over zealousness, and impatience on the parf. of 
Imari Obadele and his supporters with regard to being more pragmatic and strategically 
aware of their opportunities to build a solid base for national defense and financial 
support. Where as, SNCC had began its political work in the south and had established 
the beginning of a power base with the LCFP, the PGRNA began its political work and 
had established a power base in Detroit. As a result of being impatient and overlooking 
the political and economic strength that was centered in Detroit and other northern and 
western urban centers, to move abruptly to the south without a unified commitment from 
those in leadership, weakened the PGRNA's ability to develop and sustain their power 
and influence among its own supporters. As a result they were left vulnerable to outside 
attack without the necessary means to fight off the attack and still continue to move 
forward with their overall objective of establishing an independent nation-state. 
The BPP suffered greatly from immaturity in its leadership that manifested in the 
form of arrogance, over zealousness, and an unwillingness to share power. In Newton's 
abandonment of the BPP's demand for land and self-determination for black people to 
determine their national destiny and his subsequent alignment with white-leftist radical 
groups created disunity within the black nationalist movement. Newton sought to 
establish himself and the BPP as the premier black leader and organization of the BPE by 
adopting foreign ideologies and theories that he believed applied to the general condition 
of all oppressed people, without taking into consideration the uniqueness of the oppressed 
condition of African-Americans and their own indigenous ideologies and theories to 
overcome that oppression. In doing so, he set himself up in most cases as an adversary to 
those who did not agree with his inter-communalist position, and in some instances 
escalated to violence, which undermined the larger movement. Without question the BPP 
became the largest and most well-known black nationalist organization of the BPE, yet 
they were unable to reach their full-potential due to their inability to share power and 
work collectively with other black nationalist formations. The BPP was critically over 
zealousness in believing that they were the vanguard of the black nationalist movement 
which by implication meant that everyone else was secondary to them. Failing to see that 
they only held one piece of the puzzle to the whole, they failed to fwlfill their role as the 
military wing of the movement to ensure the defense and success of the entire movement. 
The ability of a nation to defend itself is something all nations must accomplish. 
The BPP was the most potent seed of that ability for black nationalists. Newton's 
analysis that the nation-state was becoming obsolete and that cultural nationalism was 
irrelevant and counter-revolutionary was divisive and set off power struggles within the 
black nationalist movement that were exploited by the FBI's COINTELPRO program 
and resulted, often times, in deadly violence. As a military organization the BPP was a 
key component to the success of black nationalism and its failure. The BPP attracted and 
organized thousands of black youth to defend their communities and people against the 
most overt representation of their oppression-white police violence. The failure of the 
BPP and other black nationalists to properly direct the energy of black youth into a 
disciplined national military force inevitably caused black youth to project the hate and 
violence they intended for their oppressor onto themselves, and subsequently, hundreds 
of street organizations (i.e., gangs) emerged4', ready to go to war for their own individual 
turf-land and black nation-gang. 
The relationship between the Black Church and the black nationalist movement is 
still peripheral at best. The NO1 and its current leader Louis Farrakhan have worked to 
bridge the gap between Muslims and Christians as competing religious forces. Cultural 
nationalism has increased the acceptance of African culture and also helped to bridge the 
gap between African-American's negative perceptions of Afi-ican religions and their 
relationship to the traditional worship within the Black Church. More and more Black 
Churches represent Jesus as a black Messiah and embrace many of the fundamental 
principles of black nationalism. However, the majority of Black Churches still cling to 
an integrationist-accornmadationist ideology that supports the status quo, which still 
remains an issue for black nationalists in generating a mass movement. 
Black nationalists of the BPE pushed the desire for nationhood as far as they 
could and the best way they knew how. Predictably, they made mistakes and paid heavy 
prices for them. They were also up against a myriad of forces that only practical 
experience, superior organization, and relentless struggle could have foreseen. The 
onslaught of COINTELPRO, which exploited the ideological differences and insecurities 
between black nationalist leaders, was not something black nationalists were well 
prepared to overcome. The campaign of the FBI and local police authorities to dismantle 
the black nationalist movement resulted in many black nationalists struggling to fight 
criminal charges and being incarcerated for long periods of time. As a consequence, 
black nationalist organizations embarked on campaigns to free their comrades, who were 
identified as political prisoners. 
For even the most staunch black nationalists, it would seem that the prospect of 
founding an independent nation today is less likely than it was thirty years ago, but that 
would be a mistake to assume. The success of black nationalists founding a sovereign 
nation lies in their ability to correct their internal problems, develop a wholistic view that 
incorporates every sector of African-American society, develop a long range plan that 
addresses all facets of nationhood, and meets the needs of its people. It may take several 
generations to bring the vision of black statehood into fruition, but one must remember 
the long fight of Afi-ican-Americans to free themselves from enslavement as evidence of 
what it will take to make black statehood a reality. 
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